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WORK MADE FOR HIRE – ANALYZING THE
MULTIFACTOR BALANCING TEST
Ryan Vacca*
Authorship, and hence, initial ownership of copyrighted works is oftentimes
controlled by the 1976 Copyright Act’s work made for hire doctrine. This
doctrine states that works created by employees within the scope of their
employment result in the employer owning the copyright. One key
determination in this analysis is whether the hired party is an employee or
independent contractor. In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court, in CCNV v.
Reid, answered the question of how employees are distinguished from
independent contractors by setting forth a list of factors courts should
consider. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not give further guidance
on how to balance these factors. Three years later, in 1992, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Aymes v. Bonelli and noted that not
all factors are equally weighted and that five of the factors would “be
significant in virtually every situation.” This analysis was supported by
looking at all the work made for hire cases decided in the three year period
since Reid – six cases in total. This Article expands in both scope and time
what the Second Circuit did in Aymes and systematically analyzes how
courts have utilized the factors in the twenty-five years since Reid. In
particular, this study has identified the universe of cases where the courts
have decided whether a hired party was an employee or independent
contractor and uses the data from these cases to describe what factors
appear to be the most and least important in reaching these conclusions.
Based on the results of this study, this Article proposes a continuum of
importance, which graphically illustrates the relative importance of each
factor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Authorship plays a central role in copyright law.1 Conferring this
title on people or entities bestows on them initial ownership of the
copyright2 and the power to exploit the associated rights.3 Hence, it is no
1

See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have the power . . . to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”) (emphasis
added); see also Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
“Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455 (1991)(“‘authorship’ . . . is arguably the most
central, and certainly the most resonant, of the foundational concepts associated with
Anglo-American copyright doctrine.”).
2
17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
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surprise that authorship is an oft-disputed issue between parties contesting
the use of copyrighted works.4
In many circumstances, determining authorship is easy because the
general rule is that “the author is the party who actually creates the work [–]
the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression.”5 The
artist who paints a bowl of fruit in her home studio on the weekend to sell at
a community art show is an easy example of the traditional notion of
authorship. The glaring exception to this general rule is the work made for
hire doctrine. In part, this doctrine provides that “a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment”6 is consequently
owned by the employer.7 But the work made for hire doctrine does not
simply change initial ownership of the copyright.8 This doctrine has found
its way into several other issues, such as modifying the duration of the
copyright,9 eliminating the right to terminate transfers of copyright,10 and
prohibiting the acquisition of moral rights.11
But unlike Hamlet, where the question was “to be, or not to be,”12
for the work made for hire doctrine, the question is “employee or
independent contractor?”
Distinguishing between employees and
independent contractors under the 1976 Copyright Act’s work made for hire
doctrine is an essential problem courts and parties need to resolve before
3

Id. §§ 106, 106A (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize any of the following: . . . .”) (“[T]he author of a work a work of visual art
– shall have the right . . . .”).
4
See e.g. Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2008), Numbers
Licensing, LLC v. bVisual USA, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (E.D. Wash. 2009), JustMed,
Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2010), Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v.
Martha Graham Ctr. Of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2nd Cir. 2004), Brower
v. Martin, 446 F. Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. Nat’l Fire Prot.
Ass’n, Inc., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1651 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
5
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
6
17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of work made for hire).
7
Id. § 201(b).
8
Jon M. Garon & Elaine D. Ziff, The Work Made for Hire Doctrine Revisited: Startup and
Technology Employees and the Use of Contracts in a Hiring Relationship, 12 MINN. J. L.
SCI. & TECH. 489, 490 (2011).
9
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (copyright generally persists for the life of the
author plus seventy years) with 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012) (copyright in a work made for
hire “endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120
years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first.”).
10
Id. § 203(a) (“In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the exclusive or
nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright . .
. is subject to termination. . . .”); see also id. § 304(c), (d) (same exclusion, but applied to a
different set of transfers).
11
See id. § 106A (granting moral rights “the author of a work of visual art”) and §
101(2)(B) (definition of “work of visual art” as not including a work made for hire).
12
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act III, sc. 1.
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proceeding to analyze how ownership, duration, terminations of transfers,
and moral rights are affected.13
Nearly twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to
give guidance to judges and parties involved in disputes over the
employment status of hired individuals.14 In 1989, the Court issued its
opinion in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid15 and declared that
distinguishing employees from independent contractors should be
accomplished by using a multifactor balancing test.16 This test, which uses
approximately a dozen factors, clarified what the proper test was, but
spawned questions about how those factors are balanced and which factors,
if any, are the most important in the analysis.17
Three years after Reid, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
decided Aymes v. Bonelli and noted that not all factors are equally
weighted.18 The court in Aymes went further still and opined that five of the
factors would “be significant in virtually every situation.”19 This analysis
was supported by reviewing all the work made for hire cases decided in the
three-year period since Reid – six cases in total.20
This Article greatly expands upon the Second Circuit’s work in
Aymes. It is the first study to comprehensively and systematically analyze
the work made for hire factors and show their relative importance in
distinguishing employees from independent contractors. It contributes to
the existing and highly-regarded literature of empirical studies analyzing
multifactor tests.21 Using a data set consisting of the population of work
made for hire cases decided since Reid where the courts determined the
status of the hired party, this Article illustrates which factors are the most
and least important in drawing this distinction. These results confirm, in
part, what the Second Circuit in Aymes believed – that a small subset of
factors is important.22 Likewise, these results show that some factors
originally thought to be important are not terribly important and that other
13

See Garon & Ziff, supra note 8, at 490.
See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
15
Id.
16
Id. at 751-52.
17
See infra Parts II.E-F.
18
Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (1992).
19
Id.
20
See id. at 862-63 (citing six cases decided between 1990 and 1992).
21
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1581 (2006), Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair
Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Kevin Blum et al., Consistency
of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year Revisiting of Barton Beebe’s Empirical Analysis of
Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2010).
22
See infra Part II.F.
14
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factors originally thought to be of only moderate importance are actually
very important.23
Part II provides historical background on the work made for hire
doctrine and illustrates how the doctrine has evolved from when its
foundation was laid in the mid-1800s through the Second Circuit’s 1992
decision in Aymes.24 Specifically, during the course of this discussion, I
describe the legislative histories leading up to the codification of the work
made for hire doctrine in the 1976 Copyright Act25 and the circuit split
occurring after its enactment, which eventually led to the Supreme Court’s
resolution in Reid.26 Part II concludes by recounting the Supreme Court’s
rationale for adopting the multifactor test in Reid27 and the Second Circuit’s
explanation of the important and unimportant factors in Aymes.28
Part III describes the methodology and results of this study.29 In this
part, I explain the type of data collected, describe how this data is used to
show four different measures of importance, and display how each factor
ranks using each measure.30 Most importantly, based on the results of these
measures, I propose a continuum of importance for the Reid factors.31 This
continuum groups together factors sharing similar features with respect to
the measures of importance.32 Part III concludes by testing how useful the
continuum is at predicting the ultimate outcome of the work made for hire
cases.33
Part IV first attempts to situate the results of this study within the
historical development of the work made for hire doctrine and see whether
these results cohere with the Supreme Court’s rationales for adopting and
rejecting the various interpretations existing before Reid.34 Part IV then
considers the implications of this study, paying attention to litigation and
business-planning contexts.35 Special attention is drawn to terminations of
transfers litigation involving sound recordings as a case study on how the
results of this study may ultimately affect the outcome of this impending
litigation.36
23

See infra notes 260-261 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.
25
See infra Parts II.A-C.
26
See infra Part II.D.
27
See infra Part II.E.
28
See infra Part II.F.
29
See infra Part III.
30
Id.
31
See infra Fig. 1 in Part III.B.
32
Id.
33
See infra Fig. 2 and preceding discussion in Part III.B.
34
See infra Part IV.A.
35
See infra Part IV.B.
36
See infra Part IV.B.2.
24
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II. AUTHORSHIP AND THE WORK MADE FOR HIRE
DOCTRINE
To understand the modern work made for hire doctrine, it is
necessary to appreciate how it came into being. Many of the changes taking
place in 1976 and subsequent interpretations were heavily influenced by
earlier copyright acts and how courts construed the work made for hire
doctrine. The most significant of these early acts was the 1909 Copyright
Act. This part of the Article briefly describes the work made for hire
doctrine during the pre-1909 period and then discusses the codification of
this doctrine in the 1909 Act and how the courts gradually, but greatly,
modified this doctrine. Afterwards, this part describes the legislative
history leading to the 1976 Act and the final codification in section 101,
which left courts struggling with how to determine whether a hired party
was an employee or independent contractor. Next, this part explains the
four approaches lower courts used in making this determination before the
Supreme Court resolved the issue in its historic 1989 case – CCNV v. Reid.
Finally, it describes how the Second Circuit in Aymes v. Bonelli put an
additional gloss on Reid, which serves as the jumping off point for this
study and is fully explored in Parts III and IV.
A. Pre-1909 Case Law
The earliest appearance of the work made for hire doctrine (or at
least the foundation for the doctrine) occurred in the 1860s.37 Prior to this
time, hiring parties were never entitled to the copyright of the parties they
hired absent an agreement assigning the copyright to the hiring party. 38 As
such, no distinction was drawn between employees and independent
contractors because hiring parties were not entitled to the copyright by
virtue of employment.39
During the 1860s, a shift occurred and courts began to recognize
that hiring parties did have a copyright interest in the works prepared by
those they hired to create.40 One of the earliest cases laying the foundation
for the work made for hire doctrine was Keene v. Wheatley.41 Keene

37

Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-For-Hire Doctrine, 15
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5 (2003) (“The concept began to appear after 1860. . . .”).
38
Id. at 32.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861).
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involved the famous play, Our American Cousin.42 In relevant part, the
British author, Tom Taylor, sold the American rights to Laura Keene, a
New York City theater owner.43 Joseph Jefferson, an actor in Keene’s
company, adapted the play for performance in Keene’s New York theater.44
The play became a huge success in New York and Jefferson sold his
additions in the play to Wheatley and John Clark, two Philadelphia theater
producers, who had previously acquired a British copy of the play.45 After
a successful exhibition of the play in Philadelphia, Keene filed suit alleging
copyright infringement.46 The court held that Keene did not have a valid
copyright to the original version of the play because Taylor was not a U.S.
resident.47 Notwithstanding this ruling, the court also held that Keene could
seek a remedy against Wheatley and John Clark for Jefferson’s additions to
the play.48 As the court explained:
Mr. Jefferson, while in the general theatrical employment of
the complainant, engaged in the particular office of assisting
in the adaptation of this play; and made the additions in
question in the course of his willing performance of this
duty. She consequently became the proprietor of them as
products of his intellectual exertion in a particular service in
her employment.49
In particular, the court declined to hold that the Keene was entitled to the
copyright as a matter of statutory copyright law but, instead, based its
holding on equitable principles.50
Eight years later, in Lawrence v. Dana,51 a federal court collapsed
the distinction between statutory copyright law and equitable principles.52
Lawrence involved an international law treatise written by Henry
Wheaton.53 Upon Henry Wheaton’s death, his wife, Catharine, sought the
42

Id. at 181. Our American Cousin is famously known as the play occurring at Ford’s
Theater the night President Lincoln was assassinated by John Wiles Booth. Fisk, supra
note 37, at 38 n.125.
43
Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 182.
44
Id.
45
Fisk, supra note 37, at 37-38.
46
Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 184.
47
Id. at 185; Fisk, supra note 37, at 39.
48
Fisk, supra note 37, at 40.
49
Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 187.
50
Id.; Fisk, supra note 37, at 40.
51
Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
52
Fisk, supra note 37, at 43.
53
Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 26.
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assistance of William Lawrence to prepare a new edition of the treatise.54
As part of the agreement between Catharine and Lawrence, Catharine
agreed to not make use of Lawrence’s notes in a new edition of the treatise
without his consent.55 Subsequent litigation over the treatise ensued and in
dictum the court indicated that had the parties not entered into a contract for
Lawrence to retain the copyright, Catharine would have owned the
copyright because of the employment relationship between them.56 This
dictum was repeated throughout the rest of the nineteenth century as courts
reallocated copyright ownership by including an implied contract between
the parties that favored the hiring party owning the copyright.57 Despite
courts entertaining the idea of the hiring party owning the copyright in the
absence of an express assignment to that effect, there was confusion about
whether the default rule favored the hiring or hired party.58 The cause for
this shift from a default rule of hired party ownership to a default rule of
hiring party ownership is muddled.59 Nonetheless, one thing is clear – the
courts deciding copyright cases during this period drew no distinction
between employees and independent contractors like is done in the modern
context.60
It was not until nearly the turn of the century that the principle of
hiring party-owned copyrights was more firmly established.61 In 1899, the
court in Collier Engineer Co. v. United Correspondence Schools62 noted
that it was the employer of a salaried employee that was the copyright
owner of instructional materials for a correspondence school.63 The
following year, the court in Dielman v. White64 held that “when an artist is
commissioned to execute a work of art not in existence at the time the
commission is given, the burden of proving that he retains a copyright in the
work of art executed, sold, and delivered under the commission rests
heavily upon the artist himself.”65

54

Id.
Id.
56
Id. at 51; Fisk, supra note 37, at 43.
57
Fisk, supra note 37, at 45.
58
Id. at 47 (“by the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the law of employee
copyrights was highly uncertain and the results of cases were quite unpredictable.”).
59
See id. at 45 (suggesting the cause of this shift was based on (1) reflecting the intent of
most parties, (2) employers having a stronger moral claim, or (3) changing assumptions
about the nature of authorship).
60
Id. at 46.
61
Id. at 55.
62
Collier Eng’r Co. v. United Correspondence Sch., 94 F. 152 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899).
63
Fisk, supra note 37, at 59-60.
64
Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900).
65
Dielman, 102 F. at 894.
55
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B. The 1909 Act
After an uncertain history, Congress finally recognized the work
made for hire doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1909.66 The 1909 Act
provided that “the word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the case of
works made for hire.”67 This provision of the 1909 Act resulted from a
meeting in 1905 between industry leaders and the American Authors’
League.68 The initial draft stated that only “authors” could obtain
copyright, but industry leaders objected.69 The Copyright Office proposed a
revised bill that did not have a general work made for hire provision, but
instead had a section indicating that the “publisher of a composite or
collective work . . . which has been produced at his instance and expense”
would be entitled to a copyright.70 However, industry leaders were still
unsatisfied. As one participant complained:
We have people who work for us who make engravings or
etchings for us under salary. Under the new law – if it
becomes a law as drafted – they would have the right to
copyright, and I think it would be well to express in such a
law that where no agreement exists to the contrary the
payment of a salary to an employee shall entitle an employer
to all rights to obtain a copyright in any work performed
during the hours for which such salary is paid. It seems to
me these things should not be left to the courts to decide.71
Interestingly, this comment indicates that some industry leaders believed
that the copyright in works created by salaried employees during their
employment would belong to the employer.72 The Copyright Office was
persuaded by such comments and prepared another draft of the bill, which
credited authorship to “[a]n employer, in the case of a work produced by an
employee during the hours for which his salary is paid, subject to any
66

Michael B. Landau, “Works Made For Hire” After Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid: the Need for Statutory Reform and the Importance of Contract, 9
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 107, 110 (1990).
67
Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, §62, 35 Stat 1075, 1088.
68
Fisk, supra note 37, at 63.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 64 (citing 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT xxiv (B. Fulton
Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds, 1976)).
71
Id. (citing 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT 65 (B. Fulton
Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds, 1976)).
72
See id. (citing 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT 65 (B. Fulton
Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds, 1976)).
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agreement to the contrary.”73 Later, in 1906, Congress held joint hearings
and produced the language ultimately ending up in the 1909 Act – “the
word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the case of works made for
hire.”74 Unfortunately, Congress failed to define “work made for hire” and
“employer.”75
One of the earliest cases interpreting the 1909 Act’s work made for
hire provision was National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman.76 In Kaufman,
the plaintiff, a corporation, claimed a copyright in a fashion book.77 The
defendant reproduced portions of this book and when sued for copyright
infringement, moved to dismiss.78 In the course of opinion, the Second
Circuit discussed the newly-enacted 1909 Act and the work made for hire
doctrine.79 Importantly, the court noted that “[under the previous law], as
well as now, the employer had the right to the copyright in the literary
product of a salaried employe[e].”80
The last major development in the work made for hire doctrine
before enactment of the 1976 Act was Brattleboro Publishing Co. v.
Winmill Publishing Corp.81 In Brattleboro, newspaper advertisers hired
The Brattleboro Daily Reformer, a local newspaper, to create
advertisements.82 These advertisements appeared in the Brattleboro Daily
Reformer and subsequently appeared in the Brattleboro Town Crier, a
direct-mail circular.83 The Brattleboro Daily Reformer sued the Brattleboro
Town Crier for copyright infringement for reproducing the
advertisements.84 On appeal, the Second Circuit stated that in determining
whether a work was a work made for hire under the 1909 Act, it applied the
“instance and expense test.”85 That is, the copyright is owned by “the
person at whose instance and expense the work is done.”86 In Brattleboro,
the court held that the advertisers, who hired the newspaper, were the
73

Id. at 66 (citing 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT xxx (B. Fulton
Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds, 1976)).
74
Id. (citing 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT pt J (B. Fulton
Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds, 1976)).
75
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B][1][a][i]
(2012).
76
National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 F. 215 (C.C.M.D. Pa. 1911).
77
Id. at 216.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 217.
80
Id. (emphasis added).
81
Brattleboro Publ’g Co. v. Winmill Publ’g Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2nd Cir. 1966).
82
Id. at 568.
83
Id. at 567.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
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copyright owners of the advertisements.87 Importantly, the Second Circuit
opined that the “instance and expense test” applied regardless of whether
the hired party was a traditional employee or an independent contractor.88
Collapsing the distinction between employees and independent contractors
laid the foundation for some of the confusion arising from the 1976 Act’s
work made for hire provision.
C. The 1976 Act – Legislative History and Statutory Text
The deluge of technological advancements created in the wake of
the 1909 Act caused the judges interpreting it to stretch the statutory
language to its limits to accommodate these developments.89 As a result, in
1955, Congress decided to overhaul the 1909 Act, which included funding
thirty-five studies on copyright issues.90 One of these studies, study number
thirteen, published in 1958, focused on the work made for hire issue and
reported the then-current state of the law under the 1909 Act.91
Based on these studies, the Copyright Office prepared a report on
copyright law revisions, including recommendations on how to deal with
the work made for hire issues.92 This 1961 report recommended that works
made for hire be defined as “works created by an employee within the
regular scope of his employment”93 and suggested that commissioned works
fell outside this definition.94 Following publication of the 1961 report,
stakeholders voiced their concerns about the recommendations.95 One
objection lodged by the motion picture industry concerned the use of the
phrase “regular scope of his employment” in the definition.96 The movie
87

Id. at 568.
Id. at 567-68; see also Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr.
of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 635 (2nd Cir. 2004).
89
Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857, 857-58 (1987).
90
Id. at 872; I.T. Hardy, Copyright Law’s Concept of Employment – What Congress Really
Intended, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A. 210, 222 (1988).
91
See BORGE VARMER, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE AND ON COMMISSION (1958), reprinted in
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG, 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION (1960).
92
Hardy, supra note 90, at 224; HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter 1961
Register Report], reprinted in 8 NIMMER, supra note 75, at app. 14.
93
Hardy, supra note 90, at 224; 1961 Register Report, supra note 92, reprinted in 8
NIMMER, supra note 75, at app. 14.
94
Hardy, supra note 90, at 224; 1961 Register Report, supra note 92, reprinted in 8
NIMMER, supra note 75, at app. 14.
95
Hardy, supra note 90, at 225-28; Landau, supra note 66, at 115.
96
Hardy, supra note 90, at 225 n.66.
88
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studios thought this language narrowed what the studios had typically been
able to claim as their own.97 None of the objections concerned the
understanding of what the term “employee” meant.98 In fact, as Professor
Trotter Hardy describes it, the comments to the 1961 report implicitly
recognized “employee” to mean formal employees – those paid on a regular
schedule.99
After these discussions, the Copyright Office published a
“Preliminary Draft Bill” in 1963.100 This bill defined work made for hire as
“a work prepared by an employee within the scope of the duties of his
employment, but not including a work made on special order or
commission.”101 Although the 1963 Preliminary Draft Bill included a few
changes to the work made for hire doctrine, it did not define the term
“employee.”102 Stakeholders’ understanding of the term “employee”
became clear as a result of the objections to the provision in the 1963
Preliminary Draft Bill stating that specially ordered or commissioned works
were not works made for hire.103 As the stakeholders argued about the
status of commissioned works, they frequently contrasted commissioned
individuals with employees.104 Again, as Professor Hardy articulately
describes, these references to employees almost always describe employees
as individuals who were formal employees – those who were on the payroll
and paid a regular salary.105
Following this set of discussions, Congress introduced the 1964
bill,106 which included commissioned works within the definition of “work
97

Id. Another objection to the proposal was that employers would not be considered
authors, but merely owners of the copyright. Id. at 226.
98
DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 152-60 (Feb. 1963) in 3 GEORGE S.
GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY – U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE REPORT DISCUSSION DRAFT 1961-1964 (William S. Hein & Co. 2001).
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Hardy, supra note 90, at 226-27.
100
Id. at 228; Landau, supra note 66, at 115.
101
Hardy, supra note 90, at 228; Landau, supra note 66, at 115.
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Hardy, supra note 90, at 229.
103
Id. at 332-35. The debate about commissioned works was that federal copyright law
would preempt common law copyright, which had treated hiring parties that commissioned
works as the copyright owner. In effect, commissioned works were treated similarly to
employee-created works, but with preemption in effect that common law development
would no longer exist and the hiring party would not own the copyright unless the hired
party agreed to assign it. This, in conjunction with the introduction of the termination of
transfer provisions, which did not apply to works made for hire, caused much consternation
for the film, textbook, reference publishers. Id. at 229-32.
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Id. at 232-35.
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Id.
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Technically, Congress introduced three identical bills – S. 3008, H.R. 11947, and H.R.
12354. For the sake of simplicity I refer to them collectively as the 1964 bill. Id. at 236.
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made for hire.”107 In fact, the 1964 bill provided that any specially ordered
or commissioned work would be a work made for hire “if the parties
expressly agree in writing that it shall be considered a work made for
hire.”108 This one hundred eighty degree change on specially commissioned
works raised objections from individual creators who had been routinely
hired as independent contractors, especially members of the Authors
League.109 After much haranguing, the two sides of the work made for hire
debate were able to find some common ground and agreed that some types
of specially commissioned works should be works made for hire, while
other types were not appropriate for that treatment.110 Because the focus of
this round of discussions centered on specially commissioned parties, rather
than employees, nothing was said on what constituted an employee.111
At last, in 1965, Congress introduced two bills 112 which defined
“work made for hire” as “a work prepared by an employee within the scope
of his or her employment”113 and also specially ordered or commissioned
works falling within four categories of works, including a contribution to a
collective work, parts of a motion picture, translations, and supplementary
works, if the parties expressly agreed in writing that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire.114 After further discussions, this list of
categories was expanded to include compilations, instructional texts, tests,
atlases, and answer materials for a test.115 In the Congressional hearing,
industry witnesses again focused on the specially commissioned works, but
in reference to this issue, they explained their understanding of what an
employee was.116 As they had in the past, the stakeholders considered
107
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employees as those who were paid a salary for either a fixed or indefinite
term.117
After more than a decade of debates about the work made for hire
doctrine, the statutory language had been worked out and was enacted,
albeit a decade later, in the 1976 Copyright Act.118 In relevant part, the
definition of “work made for hire” now reads:
A “work made for hire” is—
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his
or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional
text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if
the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire.119
Although the 1976 Copyright Act uses the phrase “a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment,” it fails to define the
term “employee.”120 Nonetheless, given the extensive legislative history,
one possibility was that everyone understood the term to mean those who
were formal, salaried employees.121
D. Different Interpretations of “Employee” Under the 1976 Act
The 1976 Copyright Act went into effect on January 1, 1978 and
courts were quickly confronted with the task of having to interpret the work
made for hire language in the statute.122 During the course of the following
eleven years, the lower courts adopted four different tests to determine
whether a hired party was an employee under the first prong on the work
made for hire definition.123
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Hire?, 10 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 353, 365 (1990).
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1. Right to Control Test
The first test was known as the “right to control” test.124 Under this
test, courts looked at “whether the alleged employer has the right to direct
and supervise the manner in which the writer performs his work.”125 This
test was borrowed from case law interpreting the 1909 Act.126
One of the first cases adopting the “right to control” test was Town
of Clarkstown v. Reeder.127 In Reeder, the town decided to establish a civic
project, known as a Youth Court.128 As part of this project, the town’s
Youth Court Executive Board formed various sub-committees, including a
Constitution Committee and Steering Committee.129 Michael Reeder
voluntarily served on each of these committees.130 As part of his role on the
Steering Committee, Reeder was tasked with preparing a manual for the
Youth Court.131 Reeder drafted the manual “after receiving conceptual and
practical input from many people,” including guidance from members of the
different committees and Executive Board.132 The chairman of the
Executive Board relayed feedback from the committees to Reeder and
served as a sounding board as Reeder prepared the manual.133
Shortly after the manual was complete, Reeder contracted with
another town to help them create a Youth Court and asserted a copyright in
the Clarkstown manual.134 Initially, Reeder granted Clarkstown a license,
but after the Executive Committee requested Reeder to assign the copyright
to the town, Reeder revoked the license and litigation ensued. 135 At issue
was whether Reeder was an employee of the town and, as a result, whether
the manual was a work made for hire with the copyright belonging to the
town.136
The court held that Reeder, despite the fact that he volunteered his
time, was the town’s employee.137 The court held that the crucial factor in
124
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determining whether Reeder was an employee “is whether the alleged
employer has the right to direct and supervise the manner in which the
writer performs his work.”138 The town had this right to direct and
supervise the manner in which the manual was created because (1) the
Chairman of the Executive Board had the power to remove and appoint
members; (2) Reeder and the Chairman had ongoing discussions about
drafting the manual, including what to include and change; (3) the
Chairman assigned Reeder and another volunteer to prepare other
documents and they did; and (4) Reeder submitted proposals to the
committees and Executive Board for approval.139 The fact that no one from
the town ever ordered Reeder to write the manual in a specific format was
not dispositive.140 The court emphasized that the employment relationship
depended on having the right to control, not exercising the right.141
The court’s justification for this interpretation of the term
“employee” in the 1976 Act leaves much to be desired. Rather than looking
at the legislative history of the 1976 Act, the court reached its conclusion
about how to distinguish employees from independent contractors by
relying on three cases interpreting the muddled 1909 Act.142
2. Actual Control Test
The second test used by the courts following enactment of the 1976
Act was the “actual control” test.143 This was a variation of the “right to
control” test.144 Under the “actual control” test, courts did not just look at
whether the hiring party could control or direct the work, but looked at
whether the hiring party actually asserted control over the creation of the
work.145
The leading case on the “actual control” test is the Second Circuit’s
Aldon Accessories v. Spiegel, Inc.146 In that case, the plaintiff, Aldon, was
in the business of designing and selling figurines.147 One of Aldon’s
principals, Arthur Ginsberg, handled the creative aspects of the company,
including product-design.148 In anticipation of a new line of mythological
138
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porcelain statuettes, Ginsberg contacted a Japanese firm, Wado, about
making models for the porcelain statuettes.149
In addition to describing the pose of the porcelain statuettes and
sending drawings to Wado, Ginsberg traveled to Japan and worked with the
Wado artists to develop the porcelain statuette models.150 Working with the
artists included Ginsberg spending “hours and hours changing shapes [and]
adjusting attitudes and proportions” in addition to giving specific directions
to the artists on where to position the figures’ heads, legs, and hair.151
Afterwards, Aldon decided to develop brass versions of the statuettes and
contacted a Taiwanese firm, Unibright, about creating brass models that
differed from the porcelain models.152 Ginsberg traveled to Taiwan and
worked with Unibright’s artists in the same way he worked with Wado’s
artists.153
After Aldon began selling the statuettes, a buyer for Spiegel
inspected the statuettes at a trade show and requested a sample.154 Aldon
sent the samples and a few months later discovered Spiegel selling identical
statuettes in its catalogue.155 Aldon sued for copyright infringement and
prevailed at trial, including on the issue of whether the models created by
Wado and Unibright were works made for hire.156
On appeal, Spiegel argued that Wado and Unibright, not Aldon,
were the copyright owners (i.e. the models were not works made for
hire).157 The Second Circuit disagreed and held that the Wado and
Unibright artists were employees working within the scope of their
employment because “Ginsberg did much more than communicate a general
concept or idea to the [artists], leaving creation of the expression solely to
them.”158 The court was persuaded by the fact that “Ginsberg actively
supervised and directed the creation” of the designs and that although he did
not “physically wield the sketching pen and sculpting tools, he stood over
the artists and artisans at critical stages of the process, telling them exactly
what to do.”159
In adopting the “actual control” test, the Second Circuit cited to
several cases interpreting the 1909 Act and noted that there was “[n]othing
149
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in the 1976 Act or its legislative history indicat[ing] that Congress intended
to dispense with this prior law.”160 Rather than dissecting the legislative
history as Professor Hardy has done, the court concluded that Congress did
not intend to narrow what was meant by “employee” because there would
surely have been some discussion of this in the legislative history. 161 In
addition to the Second Circuit, the “actual control” test was adopted by the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits.162
3. Agency Test
The third test used by the courts following enactment of the 1976
Act was the “agency” test.163 Under this test, courts determined whether a
hired party was an employee or independent contractor by using the
meaning of the word “employee” as understood under agency law.164
Although there was no federal agency law, the courts suggested using the
Restatement (Second) of Agency as a guide.165 According to the
Restatement, courts consider the following factors in distinguishing
between employees and independent contractors:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master
may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of
the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the
person doing the work;
160
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(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the
job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of
the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.166
The leading case using the “agency” test was the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Easter Seal.167 Easter Seal involved a videotape of a staged
Mardi Gras style parade.168 A representative of the Easter Seal Society
entered into a contract with a television station to film the parade and edit it
to be a sixteen-minute segment for the Easter Seal Society’s telethon.169
The Easter Seal Society representative gave some suggestions to Mr. Beyer,
the head of the film crew, including camera locations, scenes to look for
during the parade, and camera angles.170 However, it was not clear whether
Mr. Beyer followed these suggestions.171 In addition, the Easter Seal
Society did not control technical issues, such as lighting, sound, and color
balance.172 Mr. Beyer made all decisions on aesthetics and technical issues
concerning the cameras and sound equipment.173
After being aired nationally, the television station permitted a
Canadian television producer to use pieces of the film footage.174 As it
turned out, the Canadian producer used the film in an adult film, Candy, the
Stripper.175 Candy, the Stripper was distributed and shown nationally by
Playboy and others.176 After learning about this, Easter Seal Society filed
suit alleging copyright infringement.177 The district court held Mr. Beyer
was not an employee of the Easter Seal Society and therefore, the television
station, which did employ Mr. Beyer, owned the copyright in the film.178
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered three different interpretations
of what constituted an employee for work made for hire purposes and
analyzed the problems associated with each.179 The Fifth Circuit discussed
a variation of the “right to control” test and described it as ignoring the
distinction between employees and independent contractors.180 Under this
test the courts focus on whether the work was done at the instance and
expense of the hiring party and ask whether the hiring party had the right to
control the work.181 The Fifth Circuit criticized this test as making the nine
categories of works under § 101(2) “completely mysterious”182 and also not
deviating from the interpretation of work made for hire under the 1909 Act,
despite a belief that Congress was trying to “tighten up the ‘work for hire’
doctrine under the 1976 Act.”183
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit was critical of the Second Circuit’s
“actual control” test in Aldon.184 The Fifth Circuit was concerned that the
“actual control” test could result in a lack of consistency between the same
buyer and seller if more than one work were produced.185 Moreover, the
Fifth Circuit thought the test was overly complicated because if a formal,
salaried employee were hired, but the work was not actually supervised by
the employer, then the employer’s copyright would be lost and this “would
be almost unimaginable.”186 Finally, the Fifth Circuit criticized the “actual
control” test because it easily slid into the “right to control” test.187
The Fifth Circuit was also critical of the agency test.188 The court
thought that such an interpretation was radically different from the work
made for hire doctrine under the 1909 Act and the court was not sure
Congress had this in mind.189 Despite these concerns, the Fifth Circuit
adopted the “agency” test because it: (1) made sense out of the specially
commissioned works categories in § 101(2); (2) tied the meaning of “work
made for hire” to a well-developed doctrine in agency law; (3) enhanced
predictability; and (4) created a “moral symmetry” with others areas of the
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law, such as the employer being liable under the theory of respondeat
superior.190
4. Formal, Salaried Employee Test
The final test used by the courts following enactment of the 1976
Act was the “formal, salaried employee” test.191 Under this test, courts
initially looked to see if the hired party “[held] himself or herself out as a
freelancer.”192 If so, then the hiring party should have anticipated the work
not being a work made for hire.193 If the relationship was ambiguous, then
a variety of factors were examined, most of which were a subset of the
factors identified under the agency test.194 These factors included: (1)
whether the hired party worked in his or her own studio or on the premises
of the hiring party; (2) whether the hiring party is in the regular business of
creating works of the type purchased; (3) whether the hired party works for
several hiring parties at a time, or exclusively for one; (4) whether the
hiring party retains authority to assign additional projects to the hired party;
(5) the tax treatment of the relationship by the parties; (6) whether the hired
party is hired through the channels the hiring party customarily uses for
hiring new employees; (7) whether the hired party is paid a salary or wages,
or is paid a flat fee; and (8) whether the hired party obtains from the hiring
party all benefits customarily extended to its regular employees.195
Importantly, the “formal, salaried employee” test does not inquire into the
degree of control and input the hiring party exercises.196
The leading case using the “formal, salaried employee” test was the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dumas v. Gommerman.197 In Dumas, ITT
Cannon contracted with graphic artist Patrick Nagel to produce four
paintings that ITT would give out as sets of lithographs to ITT Cannon’s
distributors as part of a promotional campaign.198 ITT Cannon’s advertising
agency determined the content and some parts of the design, borders, and
placement of figures and gave Nagel sketches for him to use in making the
190
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illustrations.199 After paying for the paintings and distributing some
lithograph sets, ITT Cannon had some lithographs leftover and eventually
sold some to Stefan Gommerman, an art gallery owner.200 In addition to
purchasing the lithographs, Gommerman purchased ITT Cannon’s
copyrights in the works.201
Nagel’s widow, Jennifer Dumas, became the successor in interest in
Nagel’s copyrights.202 After learning about ITT Cannon’s purported
transfer of the copyrights to Gommerman, Dumas objected to
Gommerman’s reproduction and sales of the paintings, claimed she was the
copyright owner because Nagel was an independent contractor, and filed
suit for copyright infringement.203 Gommerman defended by arguing that
the paintings were works made for hire because Nagel was ITT Cannon’s
employee.204 The district court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of
Dumas and Gommerman appealed to the Ninth Circuit.205
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit perused the legislative history of the
1976 Copyright Act and acknowledged that the final work made for hire
language in the statute was the result of a negotiated compromise.206 The
court was reluctant to upset that compromise.207 In analyzing the legislative
history, the Ninth Circuit determined that the negotiating parties used the
term “employee” when referring to “a salaried worker in a long-term
position.”208 Because ITT Cannon conceded that Nagel was not a formal,
salaried employee, the paintings were not works made for hire and the court
affirmed the district court.209
The Ninth Circuit recognized that other courts had utilized different
tests, but criticized those interpretations.210 In particular, the Ninth Circuit
opined that the Second Circuit’s “actual control” test from Aldon failed to
recognize that the 1976 Act was trying to substantively change copyright
law under the 1909 Act and that it distorted the balance struck in the
negotiations between stakeholders.211 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit joined
the Fifth Circuit’s criticisms of the “actual control” and “right to control”
199
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tests.212 And although the Ninth Circuit largely agreed with the Fifth
Circuit’s “agency” interpretation in Easter Seal, it did object to the
“agency” test as importing the “actual control” or “right to control” tests
and making it difficult to determine, ex ante, whether the hired party was an
employee or independent contractor.213
Instead, by conceiving of
employees under the “formal, salaried employee” test, the Ninth Circuit
believed there would be few disputes concerning the status of the hired
party.214
E. CCNV v. Reid and the Multifactor Balancing Test
Given the four different approaches to determining whether a hired
party was an employee or independent contractor, it was no surprise the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this circuit split. On June 5,
1989, the Supreme Court handed down its unanimous opinion in
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid and interpreted what
Congress meant by the term “employee” in the work made for hire doctrine
under the 1976 Act.215
CCNV was a nonprofit organization committed to eliminating
homelessness.216 In 1985, CCNV hired James Earl Reid to produce a
sculpture for use in a Washington D.C. Christmas pageant.217 Members of
CCNV conceived the idea of the sculpture as depicting a life-size nativity
scene, but instead of using the Holy Family, the family would be homeless
people huddled on a steam grate.218 CCNV and Reid never signed a written
agreement nor did they discuss copyright ownership.219
During the course of creating the sculpture, CCNV and Reid
communicated several times about the sculpture design, including the
position of the family, the items used to hold the family’s personal
belongings, and who would serve as models for the family members.220
Reid eventually completed the sculpture and it was displayed near the
pageant site for a month.221 The sculpture was returned to Reid for minor
repairs while CCNV prepared to take the sculpture on tour.222 Reid
212
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objected to taking the sculpture on tour and when CCNV requested return
of the sculpture, Reid refused.223 Both parties claimed ownership of the
copyright and CCNV filed suit seeking a declaration of ownership.224
The district court, after a two-day bench trial, declared that the
sculpture was a work made for hire.225 In particular, the district court held
that Reid was an employee because CCNV was the motivating factor in the
production of the work and because CCNV directed enough of Reid’s
efforts in creating the sculpture CCNV desired.226 On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit reversed and held the sculpture was not a work made for hire.227
The D.C. Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit’s “agency” test from Easter Seal
and determined that Reid was an independent contractor rather than a
CCNV employee.228
The Supreme Court, in explaining the meaning of the work made for
hire language, noted that the 1976 Act does not provide a definition of the
term “employee” and that because of this ambiguity, the four interpretations
discussed earlier had emerged.229 Ultimately, the Court adopted the
“agency” test because it was “well established that ‘where Congress uses
terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise indicates, that Congress means
to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.’”230 Because, the
Court reasoned, Congress used the term “employee” in conjunction with the
term “scope of employment” – a widely-used term of art in agency law –
and did not use any other language in the statute to indicate that it meant
something other than the common law notion of the relationship between
employers and employees, the common law agency test was appropriate.231
The Court then fleshed out what it meant by the “agency” test.232
First, it stated that in determining whether a hired party is an employee, “we
consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which
the product is accomplished.”233 Next, citing section 220(2) of the
223

Id.
Id.
225
Id.
226
Id. at 735-36.
227
Id. at 736.
228
Id. The D.C. Circuit also suggested the possibility that the sculpture could have been
jointly authored by Reid and CCNV in which case both Reid and CCNV would own the
copyright. The court remanded the case to the district court on this basis. Id.; see also 17
U.S.C. § 201(a).
229
Reid, 490 U.S. at 738-39.
230
Id. at 739 (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)).
231
Id. at 740.
232
Id. at 751.
233
Id.
224
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Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Court listed the following factors as
relevant to this inquiry:













the skill required;
the source of the instrumentalities and tools;
the location of the work;
the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to
the hired party;
the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to
work;
the method of payment;
the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
whether the hiring party is in business;
the provision of employee benefits; and
the tax treatment of the hired party.234

Although the Court cited the Restatement for the test, it is interesting to
note that the factors listed in Reid do not match up exactly to those factors
in the Restatement.235 Besides these oversights, the Court failed to provide
any guidance as to how these factors should be balanced other than noting
that “[n]o one of these factors is determinative.”236 The Court then applied
these factors to the facts of the case and held that Reid was an independent
contractor, not an employee, of CCNV because although CCNV directed
Reid’s work to the extent it met their specifications, all of the other factors
weighed in favor of Reid being an independent contractor.237
234

Id. at 751-52.
Compare id. at 751-52 with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958); see
also Assaf Jacob, Tort Made For Hire – Reconsidering the CCNV Case, 11 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 96, 109 (2009). The Court failed to include some of the Restatement factors and
added new factors not listed in the Restatement. Id. at 109. For example, the Court
introduced the following factors: the right to assign additional projects to the hired party;
the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the hired party’s
role in hiring and paying assistants; and the provision of employee benefits and tax
treatment of the hired party. Id. Likewise, the Court omitted the following factors listed in
the Restatement: whether or not the hired party is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business; the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; and
whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relations of master and servant. Id.
at 110.
236
Reid, 490 U.S. at 752.
237
Id. at 752-53.
235
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In the course of justifying the common law agency test, the Court
explained that this interpretation furthered “Congress’ paramount goal in
revising the 1976 Act of enhancing predictability and certainty of copyright
ownership.”238
In contrast, the “actual control” test undermined
predictability and certainty because the parties would not be able to know
until late in the process whether the hiring party had actually wielded
sufficient control over the hired party.239 Because CCNV had conceded that
the closely-related “right to control” test was difficult to demonstrate
without actual control, the “right to control” test suffered from a similar
flaw.240
In addition to furthering the policy goals of predictability and
certainty, the Court explained that the “right to control” test focused on the
relationship between the hiring party and the product rather than the
relationship between the hiring and hired parties.241 Accordingly, this focus
was misguided because the work made for hire language in section 101 is
written in terms of the latter rather than former.242 Moreover, the “right to
control” test ignored the dichotomy between works created by employees
and specially commissioned works because under the “right to control” test,
a specially commissioned work could also be a work by an employee as
long as the hiring party had the right to control the product.243 In short, the
“right to control” test would largely eliminate the statutory requirement for
specially commissioned works of having a signed writing specifying the
product is a work made for hire.244
Notwithstanding the Court’s critiques of the “right to control” test,
the test set forth in Reid seemed to adopt that test as the ultimate question in
the analysis.245 The confusion in the Court rejecting the “right to control”
test while at the same time partially adopting it is that the Court explained
the “right to control” test differently than the way it was originally stated in
Reeder. Under Reeder, the court defined the test as “whether the alleged
employer has the right to direct and supervise the manner in which the
[hired party] performs his work.”246 This test is nearly identical to the test
the Supreme Court partially adopts in Reid. The “right to control” test
238

Id. at 749.
Id. at 750.
240
Id. at 750 n. 17.
241
Id. at 741.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 741-42.
244
Id.
245
Id. at 751 (“In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general
common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished.”).
246
Town of Clarkson v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
239
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rejected in Reid was slightly different. The Supreme Court’s criticisms
were aimed at a test focused on whether “the hiring party retain[ed] the
right to control the product.”247 The difference between these two versions
of the “right to control” test is that one focuses on the hiring party
controlling the manner and means of production whereas the other focuses
on the hiring party controlling the product.248 The cases the Supreme Court
cites to in its discussion of the “right to control” test framed the test in terms
of the hiring party controlling the manner and means of production, rather
than the product itself,249 but whether this is a meaningful distinction is
doubtful.250
The “actual control” test suffered from a similar problem of failing
to dichotomize. The Court noted that although a work could be a work
made for hire under section 101(2) and not under 101(1) if the work was
specially commissioned, but no actual control was exercised, the Court
found there was no support for this distinction in the statutory language.251
Finally, the Court summarily rejected the “formal, salaried employee” test
because although there was some support for this approach in the legislative
history, the work made for hire provision used the term “employee” rather
than “formal employee” or “salaried employee.”252 In addition, the amici
arguing for this approach did not agree on the standard for what constituted
a “formal, salaried employee.”253
In sum, the Court’s decision in Reid settled the question that had
plagued the lower courts for several years. And although the lower courts
now had a multifactor test to help them determine whether the hired party
was an employee or independent contractor, all they were told about the test
was that no single factor was dispositive. This lack of further guidance led
to additional confusion about how the factors ought to be applied.

247

Reid, 490 U.S. at 738 (emphasis added).
1 NIMMER, supra note 75, at § 5.03[B][1][a][iii].
249
Reid, 490 U.S. at 738-39 (citing Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) and Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1985)).
250
1 NIMMER, supra note 75, at § 5.03[B][1][a][iii] (“[T]he distinction may import no
different result in many cases.”).
251
Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 (“[T]here is no statutory support for an additional dichotomy
between commissioned works that are actually controlled and supervised by the hiring
party and those that are not.”).
252
Id. at 742 n.8. It is worth noting that section 101 also does not use the term “employee
as understood by the common law of agency.”
253
Id.
248
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F. Weighting Factors – The Aymes v. Bonelli Three-Year Study
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid, the lower courts
were confronted with how the Reid factors were to be applied. According
to the Second Circuit, one district court erred in treating all the Reid factors
as equally important and simply tallying the factors in making its
determination.254 To provide the lower courts additional guidance in
applying the Reid factors, the Second Circuit in Aymes v. Bonelli suggested
that “there are some factors that will be significant in virtually every
situation.”255 In particular, the Aymes court listed the following Reid factors
as almost always being relevant and deserving of more weight in the
multifactor analysis:






the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means of
creation;256
the skill required;
the provision of employee benefits;
the tax treatment of the hired party; and
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to
the hired party.257

Of these important factors, the Second Circuit additionally noted
that the employee benefits and tax treatment factors were especially
probative because “every case since Reid that . . . applied the test . . . found
the hired party to be an independent contractor where the hiring party failed
to extend benefits or pay social security taxes.”258 In determining which
Reid factors were deserving of more weight, the Aymes court did not simply
pull these five factors out of thin air. Instead it relied on all of the cases
254

Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2nd Cir. 1992).
Id.
256
Read literally, the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means of creation is not
one of the Reid factors, but is the ultimate question that the Reid factors help courts
determine. As the Supreme Court stated in Reid, “[i]n determining whether a hired party is
an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right
to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other
factors relevant to this inquiry are [the Reid factors].” Reid, 490 U.S. at 751. Nonetheless,
many lower courts have treated this as one of the Reid factors. See e.g. Aerospace Serv.
Int’l v. LPA Group Inc., 1992 WL 12000194, *5 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 1992), Alcatel USA,
Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 645, 652-54 (E.D. Tex. 2002), Blair v. World
Tropics Prod., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834 (W.D. Ark. 2007), Hi-Tech Video Prod., Inc.
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d 1093, 1097 (6th Cir. 1995).
257
Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861.
258
Id. at 863.
255
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decided in the intervening three and a half years since Reid – six cases in
total.259
With respect to the remaining Reid factors, the Aymes court
indicated that some were generally of little use in the work made for hire
analysis.260 In particular, the court noted that whether the work is part of
the regular business of the hiring party and whether the hiring party is in
business will generally have little weight in the analysis.261
III. UPDATING AYMES – A COMPREHENSIVE MULTIFACTOR
STUDY
The pronouncement of the important factors in Aymes took place a
mere three years after Reid. Since Aymes, many more work made for hire
cases have been decided. Accordingly, a fresh and more comprehensive
look at courts’ analyses of the Reid factors will facilitate a greater
understanding of which factors are the most important in determining
whether a hired party is an employee or independent contractor. This study
examines the universe of work made for hire cases since Reid where a
determination of the hired party’s status has been made and evaluates which
factors are and are not important in the analysis. This part sets forth the
methodology for locating and coding the cases. Next, it describes the
results of this study and clusters the factors based on their importance.
A. Methodology
Using a broad search, I located what I believe to be all of the work
made for hire cases decided under the 1976 Copyright Act from June 5,
1989 through February 27, 2014.262 After eliminating false positives,263 this
259

Id. at 861-63.
Id. at 863-64.
261
Id. at 863 (“This factor will generally be of little help in this analysis.”).
262
I ran the following search in the ALLCASES database in Westlaw, which contains all
federal and state court cases: employee /p (“work for hire” “work made for hire”) /p
factor!. This yielded 108 cases. Of these 108 cases, forty-three analyzed the Reid factors
and determined whether the hired party was an employee or independent contractor. I then
ran this search in Lexis: employee /para (“work for hire” or “work made for hire”) /para
factor!. The Lexis search produced an additional seventeen cases that were not already
captured in the Westlaw search. None of these seventeen cases produced a copyright case
that analyzed the Reid factors and determined whether the hired party was an employee or
independent contractor. I then ran this search in Bloomberg Law: employee p/ (“work
made for hire” OR “work for hire”) p/ factor!. The Bloomberg search produced an
additional fifteen cases not already captured in the Westlaw and Lexis searches. Only two
of these fifteen cases produced copyright cases that analyzed the Reid factors and
determined whether the hired parties were employees or independent contractors. I
260
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search yielded forty-six work made for hire cases.264 For each case, the
following information was recorded: whether the court concluded the hired
party was an employee or independent contractor, the identity of the court
and which circuit it fell within, the year the case was decided, and whether
the case cited Aymes in the context of the five factors the Aymes court found
to almost always be important.265
In addition, for each case two variables were created for each Reid
factor. The first variable was whether the factor favored employee status,
favored independent contractor status, was indeterminate, or was not
addressed by the court. These determinations were made based on
statements by the courts about how these factors affected the outcome.
The second variable was whether the court weighted each Reid
factor. The coding options for this variable were that the court gave
additional weight to the particular factor, discounted the factor, or did not
expressly weight the factor.266 These too were based on statements (or the
absence of statements) by the courts about how much weight they were
giving each of the factors.
In addition to the twelve Reid factors, two factors that were
addressed with some frequency were added: (1) the hiring party’s right to
control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished,267 and
(2) how the hired party and hiring party referred to the hired party. Finally,
because the Reid factors are not an exhaustive list, any additional factors the
recognize that there might be other work made for hire cases that have been decided, but
were not reported in Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg. See generally Elizabeth Y.
McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, passim (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author) (describing the concept of submerged precedent); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity
and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the Eyes of Their Beholders, 91 NEB. L.
REV. 387, 427-30 (2012) (same). Given the limited search capabilities of docket
management systems, it is cost-prohibitive to do any more of an exhaustive search.
263
The false positives were mostly non-copyright cases (e.g. Title VII) or copyright cases
where the court did not decide whether the hired party was an employee or independent
contractor (e.g. denying a motion for summary judgment because there was a genuine issue
of material fact regarding the analysis).
264
In one case, Huebbe v. Oklahoma Casting Co., 663 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (W.D. Okla.
2009), the court engaged in two separate work made for hire analyses. Because these
analyses were distinct, I treated them as two cases. This explains why although there were
forty-five cases in the search, I analyzed forty-six cases as part of this study.
265
Aymes itself was also included in this last variable.
266
The weighting or discounting of the factors could be done either by the court stating that
the factor generally was entitled to additional weight or should generally be discounted (i.e.
the court stating that in its circuit, the following factors are important) or during the
application of the factor to the facts of the particular case (i.e. the court not making a
pronouncement about the factors’ importance in the abstract, but stating that a particular
factor was particularly important during the analysis of the facts before it).
267
See supra note 256.
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courts discussed in their analyses were recorded. All of the additional
factors were coded the same as the two variables used for the Reid
factors.268
B. Results
Using this data, the following calculations were made: how
frequently each factor was addressed by the courts, how consistent each
factor was with the ultimate result about the status of the hired party, and
how frequently each factor was given additional weight or discounted in the
courts’ analyses. These calculations are shown below in Table 1 as
Frequency,269 Consistency,270 Favored Weighting,271 and Discounted
Weighting,272 respectively.
These calculations all measure, in some form, the importance of the
factors. The frequency with which a factor is analyzed suggests whether
courts are considering the factor in the first place or simply ignoring it. A
frequently ignored factor is less likely to be important than one frequently
addressed. Likewise, consistency illustrates importance because a factor
that is less reliable in predicting the ultimate outcome suggests that courts
treat that factor as having less impact on the ultimate result than other
factors.273 Finally, whether a factor is discounted or given additional weight
in the analysis reflects its importance as the courts are directly addressing
which factors they take more seriously and find more probative in the
analysis and which factors they routinely declare to be of less importance.
268

My research assistant and I independently coded all of the variables and then met in
person to resolve any conflicts in the coding by reviewing the case.
269
Frequency for each factor is calculated as 46 total cases minus the number of cases the
factor was not addressed by the courts.
270
Consistency for each factor is calculated by adding together the total number of cases
where the factor’s outcome is consistent with the court’s ultimate conclusion about the
hired party’s status. For example, if the skill required factor favors a finding of employee
status and the court ultimately concludes the hired party is an employee, then this is
consistent. If, however, the court finds that the skill required factor favors a finding of
employee status, but the court ultimately concludes the hired party is an independent
contractor, then this is inconsistent. The percentage in parentheses is calculated by
dividing this number by the number in the Frequency column. In other words, when the
factor is addressed, how consistent is it with the ultimate conclusion?
271
Favored Weighting for each factor is calculated by adding together the total number of
cases where the factor is given additional weight. The percentage in parentheses is
calculated by dividing this number by the number in the Frequency column. In other
words, when this factor is addressed, how often is it favored?
272
Discounted Weighting for each factor is calculated the same way Favored Weighting is,
but counts cases where the factor is discounted rather than given additional weight.
273
Inconsistent factors are also less useful to the parties and attorneys in predicting
outcomes.
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Factor
skill required
source of
instrumentalities
and tools
work location
relationship
duration
additional
projects
when and how
long to work
payment method
hiring and
paying assistants
part of regular
business of
hiring party
hiring party in
business
employee
benefits
tax treatment
right to control
manner and
means
label

Table 1 – Summary Table
Favored
Frequency Consistency Weighting
26 (57%)
22 (85%)
8 (31%)

Discounted
Weighting
1 (4%)

33 (72%)
32 (70%)

29 (88%)
24 (75%)

2 (6%)
0 (0%)

1 (3%)
4 (13%)

29 (63%)

23 (79%)

1 (3%)

2 (7%)

29 (63%)

25 (86%)

6 (20%)

1 (3%)

32 (70%)
39 (85%)

26 (81%)
33 (85%)

0 (0%)
5 (13%)

2 (6%)
0 (0%)

18 (39%)

13 (72%)

0 (0%)

2 (11%)

29 (63%)

24 (83%)

0 (0%)

4 (14%)

9 (20%)

4 (44%)

0 (0%)

3 (33%)

36 (78%)
37 (80%)

32 (89%)
32 (86%)

12 (33%)
12 (32%)

2 (6%)
2 (5%)

36 (78%)
9 (20%)

21 (58%)
5 (56%)

5 (14%)
1 (11%)

4 (11%)
3 (33%)

Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 show how each factor fares with respect to each
of the four calculations. As illustrated in those tables, some factors tend to
rise toward the top of the list regardless of which calculation is used.274

274

For example, payment method, employee benefits, and tax treatment are in the top half
for each calculation.
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Other factors are stable in the middle275 or at the bottom276 of the list. But
there is some fluctuation of the factors’ rankings across calculations.277
Table 2
Sorted by Frequency (%)
Factor
Frequency
payment method
39 (85%)
tax treatment
37 (80%)
employee benefits
36 (78%)
right to control manner and
36 (78%)
means
source of instrumentalities
33 (72%)
and tools
work location
32 (70%)
when and how long to work
32 (70%)
relationship duration
29 (63%)
additional projects
29 (63%)
part of regular business of
29 (63%)
hiring party
skill required
26 (57%)
hiring and paying assistants
18 (39%)
hiring party in business
9 (20%)
label
9 (20%)

275

For example, relationship duration is ranked eighth, ninth, ninth, and eighth in Tables 2,
3, 4, and 5, respectively.
276
For example, whether the hiring party is in business is ranked last in every calculation.
277
For example, payment method is ranked first when sorted by frequency and discounted
weighting, but is only sixth for consistency and favored weighting.
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Table 3
Sorted by Consistency (%)
Factor
Consistency
employee benefits
32 (89%)
source of instrumentalities
and tools
29 (88%)
additional projects
25 (86%)
tax treatment
32 (86%)
skill required
22 (85%)
payment method
33 (85%)
part of regular business of
hiring party
24 (83%)
when and how long to work
26 (81%)
relationship duration
23 (79%)
work location
24 (75%)
hiring and paying assistants
13 (72%)
right to control manner and
means
21 (58%)
label
5 (56%)
hiring party in business
4 (44%)
With respect to weighting factors, it is worth noting that other than
giving additional weight to employee benefits, tax treatment, skill required,
and arguably the right to assign additional projects, courts do very little
favorable weighting.278 Discounted weighting is even rarer. Although the
hiring party being in business and the label used to describe the hired party
are discounted thirty-three percent of the time, in terms of raw numbers, this
discounting occurred in only three cases for each measure.279

278
279

See Table 4.
See Table 5.
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Table 4
Sorted by Favored Weighting (%)
Favored
Factor
Weighting
employee benefits
12 (33%)
tax treatment
12 (32%)
skill required
8 (31%)
additional projects
6 (20%)
right to control manner and
means
5 (14%)
payment method
5 (13%)
label
1 (11%)
source of instrumentalities
and tools
2 (6%)
relationship duration
1 (3%)
work location
0 (0%)
when and how long to work
0 (0%)
hiring and paying assistants
0 (0%)
part of regular business of
hiring party
0 (0%)
hiring party in business
0 (0%)
Table 5
Sorted by Discounted Weighting (%)
Discounted
Factor
Weighting
payment method
0 (0%)
source of instrumentalities
and tools
1 (3%)
additional projects
1 (3%)
skill required
1 (4%)
tax treatment
2 (5%)
when and how long to work
2 (6%)
employee benefits
2 (6%)
relationship duration
2 (7%)
hiring and paying assistants
2 (11%)
right to control manner and
means
4 (11%)
work location
4 (13%)
part of regular business of
hiring party
4 (14%)
hiring party in business
3 (33%)
label
3 (33%)
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Although each calculation by itself is helpful in understanding the
importance of a particular factor in the work made for hire analysis, no
single calculation can tell the entire story. For example, if we only looked
at the frequency with which the factors are addressed, then we might
conclude that the skill required is one of the least important of the Reid
factors.280 But although frequency tells us how often the courts address the
factor, it could be that when they do address it, they give it additional
weight in the analysis because the courts consider it to be important in the
inquiry. The skill required factor falls into this category as it is weighted
favorably 31% of the time. As described earlier, looking only at the
weighting calculations is also of limited use because of the small number of
cases where weight is discussed.281 As a result, all of the calculations must
be examined together to discover which factors are the most and least
important. Based on all four calculations in Table 1, I propose that the
continuum shown in Figure 1 describes the relative importance of the work
made for hire factors.
Fig. 1

This continuum groups together factors that share similar features
with respect to each of the calculations. For example, the factors listed as
the most important (tax treatment, employee benefits, and payment method)
all have high consistency (85% – 89%), are addressed very frequently (78%
– 85%), are often or sometimes favorably weighted (13% – 33%), and are
never or infrequently discounted (0% – 6%). In the next group of factors
(additional projects, skill required, and source of the instrumentalities and
tools), these factors all have a high consistency (85% – 88%), but have a
lower frequency (57% – 72%); they do, however, have significant weighting
(6% – 31% favorable; 3% – 4% discounting). Because this group is similar
280
281

Skill required is ranked eleventh in Table 2.
See supra text accompanying notes 278-279.
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in many respects to the “most important” group, but is addressed with less
frequency, these factors are grouped together and deemed slightly less
important.
At the other end of the continuum are the least important factors.
These factors (right to control the manner and means, the label used to
describe the hired party, and whether the hiring party is in business) have
very poor consistency (44% – 58%). And although the right to control the
manner and means factor is addressed with high frequency (78%), this
means very little given how inconsistent it is (58%) and that courts also split
on whether it receives favorable weighting (14%) or is discounted (11%).
The other two factors in this group are rarely addressed (20%) and are the
most likely to be discounted in the analyses (33%).
Whether a particular factor belongs in one group down or one group
up is certainly debatable; reasonable minds can differ. Illustrating the
importance of the factors using a continuum with fuzzy lines separating the
groups rather than strict lines of demarcation between the groups was
purposefully chosen to acknowledge this.
To test how useful these groups are at predicting the ultimate
outcome in a case, the top three factors were analyzed. If a majority of the
three factors that were addressed favored the ultimate outcome, this was
considered a successful prediction. If only two of the three factors were
addressed and they were split, this was considered an unsuccessful
prediction. Using only the three most important factors (tax treatment,
employee benefits, and payment method), eighty-seven percent of the cases
would be decided consistent with courts’ ultimate conclusion. When this
study was done using the most important two groups, ninety-one percent of
the cases would be decided consistent with the courts’ ultimate conclusion.
In contrast, doing the same analysis using the three least important factors
yielded a forty-eight percent success rate. Expanding this to the five least
important factors improved the success rate to sixty-three percent. Doing
the same analysis for the middle three factors yielded a seventy-eight
percent success rate. These results are displayed below in Figure 2. In sum,
the structure of this continuum appears to correctly illustrate the relative
importance of the Reid and other commonly-considered factors.282
282

There are, of course, limitations on this study. The primary limitation is the small
number of cases (n=46) involved in the study. Because of this relatively small number of
cases, it makes it nearly impossible to make the data any more granular. For example, it
might be interesting to see if the factors’ importance changes based on the type of industry
or work at issue. Although there are some industries or works that occur with some
frequency (e.g. architecture and software), there are not enough of these cases to be able to
draw any meaningful conclusions. Another limitation of this study is the potential for
selection bias. That is, the parties or their attorneys deciding which case to bring and not
bring based on how the courts addressed the factors in previous decisions. This issue exists
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Fig. 2

IV. DISCUSSION
The results of this study lead to two broad questions. First, how do
these results fit within the long and varied developments of the work made
for hire doctrine? Second, going forward, what are the implications of these
results? This part explores each of these questions.
With respect to reflecting on the results in light of the historical
developments, this part discusses how these results square with the Second
Circuit’s statement in Aymes about the importance and lack of importance
of specific factors.283 In addition, it examines whether and how these
results cohere with the pre-Reid interpretations of “employee” and the
Supreme Court’s rationales for adopting and rejecting these
interpretations.284
With respect to the implications of these results, this part first
explores how these results may affect general copyright litigation where the
parties contest the work made for hire status of a work.285 Afterwards, these
results are situated within the context of the impending litigation concerning
the work made for hire status of music recorded after 1977.286 Finally, this
with any study based on reported cases, but the effect could be more pronounced in this
situation given the small number of cases.
283
See infra Part IV.A.
284
See id.
285
See infra Part IV.B.1.
286
See infra Part IV.B.2.

38

WORK MADE FOR HIRE

part suggests how these results may be of use to business planning attorneys
so they can effectively advise their clients to achieve their desired results.287
A. Doctrinal Fit
In Aymes, the Second Circuit concluded that the following factors
were the most important in the multifactor analysis:






the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means of creation;
the skill required;
the provision of employee benefits;
the tax treatment of the hired party; and
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to
the hired party.288

Of the five Aymes factors, four are within the top two groups of the
continuum.289 The only Aymes factor not in these top two groups is the
hiring party’s right to control the manner and means of creation. This factor
is surprisingly within the least important group of the continuum. As noted
earlier, the Supreme Court in Reid suggested this was not itself a factor, but
was the ultimate question to be answered using the listed factors.290 Despite
this, many lower courts have deemed the right to control a factor, rather
than the ultimate conclusion.291 The lack of importance of this factor is
surprising given that it is supposed to be determined by the other factors.292
Given that two courts (the Supreme Court and Second Circuit) have
bolstered the importance of this factor, it is worth emphasizing that other
courts have, by and large, ignored this authority.
In addition to overemphasizing the importance of the right to control
factor, the Aymes court underappreciated the importance of the method of
payment factor. The court acknowledged that this could be a “fairly
287

See infra Part IV.B.3.
Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2nd Cir. 1992).
289
Employee benefits and tax treatment are in the most important group. The skill required
and right to assign additional projects are in the second most important group.
290
See supra note 256.
291
Id.
292
In theory, the lack of importance of the right to control factor could make sense given
the way the Supreme Court and Restatement (Second) of Agency phrase the test as the
ultimate question. In other words, if the lower courts interpreted Reid this way, then it
would not be an important factor because it is not really a factor at all. However, this
explanation is not warranted given that the lower courts have frequently treated the right to
control as a factor (78% frequency). Ultimately, this factor is not consistent with the
outcomes and is treated inconsistently by the courts with respect to the weighting.
288
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important factor,”293 but as illustrated above, this factor turns out to be one
of the three most important factors. To a lesser extent, the source of the
instrumentalities was underappreciated by Aymes, which is within the same
group as the skill required factor.
In addition to declaring which factors were the most important, the
Aymes court also opined that whether the work is part of the regular
business of the hiring party and whether the hiring party is in business were
of little use in the analysis.294 Based on the results of this study, it turns out
that Aymes was certainly correct with respect to whether the hiring party is
in business because this factor is in the least important group. However,
being part of the regular business of the hiring party is not as
inconsequential as Aymes made it out to be. Although not one of the most
important factors, this factor is in the middle of the pack.
In sum, the statements in Aymes about the importance or lack of
importance of specific factors are largely, but not completely, consistent
with the results of this study. Of course, this could be attributed to path
dependency. That is, the courts were bound to follow or were heavily
influenced by Aymes. Of the forty-six cases, thirty-six postdated Aymes. Of
those thirty-six cases, eight (22%) cite to Aymes, or a case citing Aymes, for
the proposition that the Aymes factors are the important ones.295 Although
path dependency probably had some influence on the ultimate outcome of
the importance of the factors, the variations between the results of this study
and the conclusions in Aymes suggest that path dependency was not
dispositive in determining importance.
With respect to the results of this study as they relate to the pre-Reid
tests for distinguishing employees from independent contractors, two
observations are in order. First, as described earlier, although the Supreme
Court cast the rejected “right to control” test as focusing on controlling the
product as opposed to controlling the manner and means of production,296 it
is questionable whether there is a meaningful difference between them.297
Nonetheless, the “right to control” test as adopted by the lower courts
before Reid focused on the right to control the manner and means in which
the hired party worked.298 Even assuming the Supreme Court had correctly
understood the “right to control” test, the results of this study suggest that
the right to control is unimportant. This factor is in the least important
293

Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863.
Id.
295
Of course, courts that reached a similar conclusion with respect to how they balanced
the factors could have read Aymes, but failed to cited to the opinion.
296
See supra notes 246-249 and accompanying text.
297
See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
298
See e.g. Town of Clarkson v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
294
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group on the continuum. As a result, the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
“right to control” test is consistent with the results of this study. However,
because the Supreme Court misunderstood the test, the reason for the
consistency has little to do with the Court’s rationale for rejecting the
test.299
Second, when comparing the “formal, salaried employee” test with
the results of this study, we see that the Dumas factors tend to line up fairlywell with the most important factors on the continuum. Of the eight Dumas
factors, six are also found in Reid.300 Like Aymes, the Dumas factors
account for four of the top six factors. But unlike Aymes, the Dumas factors
account for all three of the most important factors. The other two Dumas
factors that are found in Reid – whether the work is part of the regular
business of the hiring party and location of the work – fall in the middle or
lower end of the continuum, but not the lowest group as occurred with the
Aymes factors. Moreover, one of the Dumas factors not listed in Reid –
working for several hiring parties or exclusively for one – was addressed in
four cases as an additional factor. This was the most common “other”
factor and although not weighted favorably or discounted, it was 100%
consistent with the ultimate outcomes in the cases. Given these results, it
may be that courts are actually using a variation of the Dumas “formal,
salaried employee” test. This comports with Professor Hardy’s view that
the “formal, salaried employee” test is the appropriate one.301 Recall that
Professor Hardy argued that the stakeholders assumed this was the test
when they negotiated the terms of the 1976 Act in light of the 1909 Act,
which seemed to recognize hiring party ownership of works created by
salaried employees.302 The factors at the important end of the continuum
support the view that a variation of the “formal, salaried employee” test is
what the courts are actually using in arriving at their conclusions. This is an
interesting result in light of how harshly the Supreme Court treated the
299

Interestingly, the Restatement (Third) of Agency, published in 2006, defines employee
as “an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of
the agent’s performance of work.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006). The
factors from the Restatement (Second) of Agency have been relegated to the comments of
section 7.07. Id. at § 7.07 cmt. f. No court has suggested reviving the right to control test
in light of this change in the Restatement.
300
These factors include: (1) whether the hired party worked in his or her own studio or on
the premises of the hiring party; (2) whether the hiring party is in the regular business of
creating works of the type purchased; (3) whether the hiring party retains authority to
assign additional projects to the hired party; (4) the tax treatment of the relationship by the
parties; (5) whether the hired party is paid a salary or wages, or is paid a flat fee; and (6)
whether the hired party obtains from the hiring party all benefits customarily extended to
its regular employees.
301
See supra notes 99, 105, and accompanying text.
302
Id.
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formal, salaried employee test in Reid.303 The importance of these factors
also brings us back full circle to the legislative history of the 1909 Act,
which focused on employees being salaried.304
One reason courts gravitate towards the three factors at the
important end of the continuum could be that they are objectively measured
and easy to apply. For example, whether the hiring party treated the hired
party as an employee or independent contractor for tax purposes only
involves looking at payroll documents and forms filed with the federal
government. Likewise, providing benefits such as insurance is easily
verified by looking at enrollment data. Similarly, the method of payment is
easily determined by looking at paystubs to figure out the frequency and
amounts paid. This is not to say that the other factors cannot be easily
proven by looking at documents or other evidence, but factors such as skill
required or the right to control the manner and means involve a certain level
of subjectivity.
One final note about Reid and the results of this study is apposite. In
justifying the “agency” test, the Supreme Court explained that “Congress’
paramount goal in revising the 1976 Act . . . [was] enhancing predictability
and certainty of copyright ownership.”305 Given the results of this study
and the multitude of cases where summary judgment is denied because of
an issue of material fact about whether the hiring party is an employee or
independent contractor, it is doubtful that the “agency” test has achieved
this result.306 Under Reid, courts balance about a dozen factors, some of
which are consistent with the ultimate conclusion and some of which have
very little to do with the ultimate result. It is odd to imagine a multifactor
balancing test such as the one set forth in Reid as providing more
predictability and certainty to the parties than a smaller set of factors would
303

See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742 n.8 (1989) (Noting
that the statutory definition of work made for hire “cannot support [the formal, salaried
employee test” and that there was disagreement about the exact contours of the test. This
test was rejected in a footnote unlike the right to control and actual control tests, which
were rejected in the main text of the opinion.).
304
See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
305
Reid, 490 U.S. at 749.
306
See e.g. Brower v. Martin, 446 F. Supp. 2d 232, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“In light of these
and other dispute questions of material fact, the court cannot conclude as a matter of law
whether plaintiff’s songs constitute works-for-hire or to whom the copyright in these songs
belongs.”), Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 416
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Having examined the Reid–Aymes factors and drawn all inferences in
favor of the Plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that either the musical
composition or the sound recording of the Vocal Phrase were created as works for hire.”),
Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n, Inc., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1651, 1673-74 (N.D.
Ill. 2006) (summary judgment is precluded because “a reasonable trier of facts could
resolve the Reid multifactor analysis in either party’s favor.”).
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achieve.307 If enhancing certainty and predictability of copyright ownership
really were Congress’ paramount goals in the 1976 Act, then perhaps the
Supreme Court should reconsider the Reid test and adopt a subset of factors
for the courts to consider. One option would be to only use the factors in
the most important and second most important groups of the continuum.
Another option would be to use the factors from the top two groups, but if
those factors are evenly split, then turn to the less important factors as tiebreakers. In the event Congress has the opportunity to revisit the work
made for hire doctrine and believes predictability and certainty are still
valuable goals vis à vis copyright ownership, then perhaps Congress could
provide more guidance as to what constitutes an employer-employee
relationship by recognizing these factors as existing in tiers. Neither is
likely, but given the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court on how to
balance the factors, lower courts have the flexibility to adopt a formal
recognition of the important and unimportant factors as suggested by the
continuum presented here.
B. Practical Implications
Although the fit between the results of this study and the underlying
doctrine and historical developments is intriguing, these results may also be
of great value to litigators and business planning attorneys in the field.
Where the parties dispute the work made for hire status of a copyright, these
results will help litigators to gather and present evidence concerning the
doctrine and to better evaluate their cases.308 One such instance, explored in
more depth below, is the upcoming litigation between artists, producers, and
record companies in regard to songs recorded after 1977.309 In the context
of business planning, these results will help attorneys structure their clients’
relationships to help achieve the desired employment status.310 Each is
discussed in detail below.

307

In the consumer context, we see that having too much choice or too many options can
lead to bad results. See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE – WHY
MORE IS LESS passim (HarperCollins Pub. 2004). Perhaps courts suffer from a similar
version of analysis paralysis in that they either fail to resolve the issue themselves and
instead let juries decide or latch onto a subset of factors and fail to engage in a complete
multifactor analysis.
308
See infra Part IV.B.1.
309
See infra Part IV.B.2.
310
See infra Part IV.B.3.
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1. General Work Made for Hire Litigation
Litigation involving employment status under the work made for
hire doctrine can arise in a few situations. For example, a defendant may
assert that the plaintiff has no right to assert a claim for copyright
infringement because the plaintiff is not the legal or beneficial owner of the
copyright as a result of the work being a work made for hire. 311 Another
example is a copyright infringement dispute between the hiring and hired
parties where the alleged infringer successfully defends by claiming
ownership of the copyright via the work made for hire doctrine.312 Another
instance could be determining whether artists are entitled to assert
violations of their moral rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990,
which does not provide moral rights to works made for hire.313 Finally, the
employment status in the work made for hire doctrine may arise in
situations involving terminations of transfers, which also do not apply to
works made for hire.314 In these situations, determining whether a party is
an employee or independent contractor may entirely or partially dispose of a
case or significantly shift negotiating power when trying to settle a dispute.
Armed with the results of this study, litigators engaged in discovery
can focus their energy and clients’ money on the factors at the most
important end of the continuum and pay less attention to those at the least
important end. After completing discovery, the attorneys can use the
continuum to decide how to present their arguments in favor of and against
a work made for hire conclusion. For example, in a motion for summary
judgment, rather than simply analyzing the factors in the order presented in
Reid, it may be more persuasive to analyze the factors in the order of
importance. If most of the factors at the important end of the continuum
support the movant, then presenting them this way may cause the judge to
grant the motion.315 Likewise, if the factors at the more important end are
311

Only the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right is entitled to institute an action
for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012).
312
See e.g. Maness v. Heavrin, 97 F.3d 1457, 1457 (8th Cir. 1996). The reason this
situation arises is because one cannot infringe a copyright they own. Richmond v. Weiner,
353 F.2d 41, 42 (9th Cir. 1965) (“[a] copyright owner cannot infringe against his own
copyright.”).
313
17 U.S.C. § 101(2)(B) (defining “work of visual art” as not including a work made for
hire.).
314
17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (“In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, [certain
granted rights are] subject to termination . . . .”). For a more detailed analysis on
termination rights, see infra Part IV.B.2.
315
This is not to say that simply reordering the factors will cause a change in outcome in
most cases. In fact, considering how to present the factors may only be useful in borderline
cases where a court is on the fence about granting or denying a motion for summary
judgment.
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split, the non-movant may want to present the factors like this to avoid
summary judgment. In addition to gathering and presenting evidence of
employment status, these results should assist attorneys in evaluating their
clients’ cases and giving more informed recommendations about whether to
settle a dispute and for how much.316 In short, focusing on the most
important factors can provide the increased predictability and certainty that
the Court in Reid thought it was providing.
2. Specific Work Made for Hire Litigation – Terminations of Transfers
and Sound Recordings
One of the most interesting areas of copyright law where the work
made for hire status will arise is with respect to terminations of transfers in
sound recordings. Section 203 of the Copyright Act permits termination
right owners to end certain post-1977 transfers of a copyright and reclaim
the copyright for themselves.317 That is, if the work and type of transfer are
eligible for termination and the termination right is exercised, all the rights
covered by the transfer revert back to the owner of the termination
interest.318 As a result, the termination right holder gets a second bite at the
apple and can attempt to negotiate a new license or assignment on more
favorable terms.319
For example, imagine an unknown artist records a song at her home
studio and in 2014 successfully sells her copyright in the sound recording to
a record company for a measly sum. The recording turns out to be a huge
success and the record company earns millions of dollars from exploiting its
acquired rights in the recording. Under section 203, after thirty-five years,
the recording artist could reclaim the copyright in the sound recording. If
316

It is unclear if the parties would settle even if they knew this information. Looking at
the forty-six cases involved in this study, in twenty-two (48%) of them, 100% of the factors
that were addressed and not indeterminate were consistent with the ultimate outcome in the
case (e.g. if nine factors were addressed, the court held all nine weighed in favor of the
outcome). In ten of the cases (22% of the total), only one factor was inconsistent with the
ultimate conclusion. Combined, 70% of the cases involved a situation where zero or one
factor was inconsistent with the ultimate outcome. Once the attorneys in these cases knew
what the facts were, it is hard to understand why the attorneys for the eventually-losing
parties would push ahead with this aspect of the litigation.
317
17 U.S.C. § 203.
318
17 U.S.C. § 203(b).
319
Corey Field, Their Master’s Voice, 48 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 145, 155 (2000).
Sections 304(c) and (d) of the Copyright Act are additional termination of transfers
provisions, but apply to copyrights transferred before 1978. 17 U.S.C. §§ 304(c), (d). Like
section 203, these sections also exclude works made from hire from termination. But
because the works were created before 1978, the 1909 Copyright Act’s work made for hire
doctrine applies rather than the modern doctrine.
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the record company wanted to continue exploiting the recording, it would
be forced to sit down at the negotiating table with the recording artist and
reach a new deal. Presumably, the recording artist will negotiate a better
deal in 2049 than she did in 2014.
As illustrated by this example, the termination of transfer right is a
powerful one. As it turns out, 2013 was the first year of terminations under
section 203320 and a wave of termination disputes is expected over the next
several years.321 These disputes (and the inevitable litigation accompanying
them) will turn, in part, on the outcome of the work made for hire analysis
and what it means to be an employee versus an independent contractor
because termination of transfer rights do not exist for works made for
hire.322 Instead, an employer whose employee created a copyrightable work
will be the author and can enjoy the copyright for the duration without the
fear of losing the copyright thirty-five to forty years later. To be sure,
terminations of transfers under section 203 apply to all types of
copyrightable works. But the looming litigation involving terminations of
transfers of sound recordings is a good case study for analyzing how the
Reid factors should be analyzed and what the likely outcome is in light of
the factors’ relative importance.
To appreciate the work made for hire analysis of sound recordings,
it is necessary to understand what sound recordings are and the potential
authors laying claim to those copyrights. Sound recordings are “works that
result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds . . .
regardless of the nature of the material objects . . . in which they are
embodied.”323 Sound recordings are to be distinguished from musical
works, which are the underlying composition and lyrics.324 An artist who
sings and records a song written by someone else has created a
copyrightable sound recording, but has no copyright interest in the
underlying composition.325
320

Section 203 applies to transfers made on or after January 1, 1978. The five-year
termination window begins thirty-five years after execution of the transfer. Therefore, the
earliest five-year window could have begun on January 1, 2013. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
321
William Henslee & Elizabeth Henslee, You Don’t Own Me: Why Work for Hire Should
Not be Applied to Sound Recordings, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 695, 704
(2011); Brian Day, In Defense of Copyright: Record Labels, Creativity, and the Future of
Music, 12 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 61, 71 (2011).
322
17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012) (“In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, [a
transfer of rights] is subject to termination . . . .”) (emphasis added).
323
Id. § 101 (definition of “sound recordings”).
324
Jessica L. Bagdanov, Internet Radio Disparity: The Need for Greater Equity in the
Copyright Royalty Payment Structure, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 135, 139 (2010).
325
See Brian Day, The Super Brawl: The History and Future of the Sound Recording
Performance Right, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 179, 182-83 (2009).
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There are three major players in the sound recording industry who
are likely to make a claim as being an author of a particular sound
recording. First are the recording artists themselves. The artists are the
individuals in the recording studio and creating the sounds by playing the
instruments and singing the lyrics. Artists could be solo artists such as Billy
Joel and Madonna or groups like Aerosmith and Bon Jovi. The House
Report accompanying the Sound Recording Act of 1971326 suggests that
recording artists can be authors of sound recordings.327 The Copyright
Office does the same.328
Second are the producers. Producers come in all forms, but many of
the most successful are those who are the driving force behind the
recording; they are the ones with a vision of the recording and orchestrate
everything from the lead vocals to instrumental solos to background
vocals.329 Producers bring their experience with songwriting and arranging,
musical performance, and recording to the table along with their musical
philosophy, knowledge of the music business, and rapport with artists to
create the sound eventually heard by the public.330 Just as with recording
artists, the House Report and Copyright Office suggest that producers may
have a claim to authorship of sound recordings.331
Third are the record companies. The role of the record company has
changed over time. Initially, the record companies exercised a great deal of
control over the creative process.332 But beginning in the 1970s, record
companies narrowed their focus to manufacturing and promoting the sale of
records.333 Nonetheless, record companies have not really abdicated all
326

The Sound Recording Act of 1971 is the legislation giving federal copyright protection
to sound recordings. Before then, the only protection afforded was common law copyright
protection. Daniel Gould, Time’s Up: Copyright Termination, Work-For-Hire and the
Recording Industry, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 91, 97-98 (2007).
327
H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1567, 1569.
328
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 56, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR SOUND
RECORDINGS 1 (1999), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56.pdf.
329
M. WILLIAM KRASILVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 37 (Billboard
Books 2000).
330
Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Termination of Transfers Time Bomb 1 n.1 (2012)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); see also Gould, supra note 326, at 112
(describing the role of the producer); see generally RICHARD BUSKIN, INSIDE TRACKS
passim (Avon Books, Inc. 1999) (interviews with several successful record producers).
331
H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1567, 1570; U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 56, supra note 328, at 1.
332
Menell & Nimmer, supra note 330, at 1 (noting that before the 1960s, the A&R
departments at the record companies “nurtured the talent by locating, writing, and
arranging music, recruiting studio musicians, and arranging recording sessions, often in
label-owned or affiliated studios.”).
333
REEBEE GAROFALO, ROCKIN’ OUT 203 (Prentice Hall 2nd ed. 2002); Day, supra note
321, at 74-75 (describing record companies subsidizing music video production, providing
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control over the creation of sound recordings334 and have a strong interest in
claiming these recordings as works made for hire.335 In fact, nearly all
recording contracts between record companies, artists, and producers
contain clauses stating that the sound recordings are works made for hire
and are owned by the record companies.336 Unfortunately for the record
companies, merely declaring a work to be a work made for hire does not
necessarily make it so.337 This is because such statements are only relevant
for specially commissioned works made for hire, not those falling under the
employee within the scope of employment provision.338
As a result, an analysis of the Reid factors is necessary to determine
whether artists and producers are employees of the record companies or
independent contractors and hence whether the sound recordings are works
made for hire.339 The remainder of this part analyzes the Reid factors in
light of common practices in the music business. Then, using the
continuum of importance, this part determines whether artists and producers
are likely to be deemed employees and provides an in-depth roadmap for
litigants and judges to analyze this issue in the upcoming cases. That being
support for promotional tours, and incurring the promotional, manufacturing, and
distribution costs).
334
See infra notes 401-414 and accompanying text.
335
Henslee & Henslee, supra note 321, at 697 (“Record companies prefer for sound
recordings to be considered under the ‘work-made-for hire’ doctrine because it prevents
this right termination and recapture.”).
336
Id.; BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS’N, THE MUSICIAN’S BUSINESS & LEGAL GUIDE 390 (Mark
Halloran ed., 2nd ed. 1996); RICHARD SCHULENBERG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC
INDUSTRY 150 (Billboard Books 2005); M. WILLIAM KRASILVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL,
THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 28, 72 (Billboard Books 2000).
337
Mark H. Jaffe, Defusing the Time Bomb Once Again – Determining Authorship in a
Sound Recording, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 139, 151 (2006).
338
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of work made for hire).
339
This article does not address whether the sound recordings could be a work made for
hire under section 101(2) of the definition, which provides this status to specially ordered
or commissioned works falling into one of nine categories. This analysis has been done by
several others and is beyond the scope of this article, which is limited to work made for
hire under section 101(1). See generally 1 NIMMER, supra note 75, at § 5.03[B][2][a][ii];
David Nimmer & Peter Menell, Sound Recordings, Works For Hire, and the Terminationof-Transfers Time Bomb, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 387 (2001); Field, supra note
319, at 174-75; Gould, supra note 326, at 127-29; Jaffe, supra note 337, at 166-69 (2006).
It is worth mentioning however that in 1999, Congress amended § 101(2) to add sound
recordings to the list of categories eligible for work made for hire status. This was done at
the insistence of the Recording Industry Association of American and rushed through
Congress as a “technical amendment” to the Omnibus Communications Reform Act of
1999 without analysis or debate. Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in
Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 375 (2002). Outrage ensued and Congress,
with its tail between its legs, repealed the amendment in Work Made for Hire and
Copyright Corrections Act of 2000. Id. at 375-76.
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said, a word of caution is in order. Like with most general rules, there are
exceptions. Contracts and practices in the record industry are no different.
Every recording contract is not the same and what may be a general practice
might not apply in a particular case.
a. Group #1
Starting with the most important group of factors, the first factor to
consider is the tax treatment. This factor likely weighs in favor of artists
and producers because record companies “rarely withhold income taxes or
contribute to social security.”340
The second factor is whether employee benefits are provided. This
factor is a tossup with respect to artists, but definitely weighs in favor of
producers. As a general rule, record companies do not provide health
insurance, dental insurance, or retirement funds.341 Nonetheless, the two
major artist unions – AFTRA and AFM – provide health and retirement
funds for their members.342 Although not directly providing these
traditional benefits, record companies are required to contribute to these
unions’ health and retirement funds as part of their agreements with the
unions.343 As a result, although not directly paying for employee benefits,
the record companies are indirectly providing them to those who qualify.
Similar agreements for the funding and provision of benefits do not exist for
producers.344 In sum, record companies have a colorable argument that they
provide benefits to artists, but not for producers. This factor could go either
way with respect to artists, but certainly weighs in favor of producers.
The last factor in this group is the method of payment. Although
record companies have a little room to argue this factor weighs in their
340

KRASILVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 336, at 203.
BRIAN MCPHERSON, GET IT IN WRITING 91 (Rockpress Pub. Co. 1999).
342
Id.; KRASILVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 336, at 64 (“The AFTRA Health and
Retirement Funds provide medical coverage and retirement benefits for eligible AFTRA
members.”); BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS’N, supra note 336, at 229; Menell & Nimmer, supra
note 330, at 5.
343
KRASILVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 336, at 60, 64.
344
E-mail from Jeff Slattery, Assistant Professor of Law and Arts & Entertainment Law
Project Director at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, to Ryan Vacca (Jan. 20, 2014, 10:25
PM EST) (on file with author) (confirming that no producers’ union exists that provides
similar benefits to authors and that agreements between producers and record companies do
not provide for such employee benefits). Professor Slattery also notes that many artists do
not receive health and retirement benefits under their agreements with labels, union
membership, or otherwise and thus are similarly situated as producers. E-mail from Jeff
Slattery, Assistant Professor of Law and Arts & Entertainment Law Project Director at
Thomas Jefferson School of Law, to Ryan Vacca (Jan. 22, 2014, 7:24 PM EST) (on file
with author).
341
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favor, it overwhelmingly favors artists and producers being treated as
independent contractors. Artists and producers are compensated identically
in two ways – advances and royalties. Artists are also compensated in a
way producers are not – union scale.345 Artists and producers receive
advances as part of a recording fund or are given separate cash advances
that are not tied to the recording fund.346 Under a recording fund
arrangement, the artist or producer pays for the recording costs and if any
money remains at the close of production, the artist or producer keeps the
rest.347 Any advances or recording funds are paid in installments with a
percentage paid before commencement of the recording and the remainder
of the payments made at various benchmarks along the way and upon
delivery and acceptance of the masters.348 Compensation via an advance
suggests that artist and producers are independent contractors as payment
by the job, instead of by the hour, is indicative of an independent contractor
relationship.349
Artists and producers are also paid a royalty based on sales of the
350
album.
These royalties are not paid to the artist and producer until the
record company has recouped its recording costs, including any advances
paid to the artist and producer.351 Once recouped, record companies
generally pay artists’ and producers’ royalties twice a year, although some
do so quarterly and others annually.352 Like with advances, the payment of
royalties is not like an hourly wage or fixed salary paid to employees at
frequent intervals. The payments cover a several-month period and the
amount varies depending on the success of the album. As a result, this
method of payment also favors artists and producers being classified as
independent contractors.
Finally, artists may be compensated at union scale.353 For singers,
as opposed to musicians, AFTRA provides minimum rates that artists must
be compensated at, even if the artists are entitled to royalties.354 Union
scale under AFTRA is calculated as the greater of a per-hour amount or per345

Menell & Nimmer, supra note 330, at 5 (“Throughout the post 1978 period, artists have
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time may be credited at union scale.”).
346
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347
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348
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KRASILVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 336, at 39-40 (producers); id. at 203 (“[recording
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351
Id. at 23 (“Artists generally do not receive any royalties until the record company has
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352
SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at 121.
353
Menell & Nimmer, supra note 330, at 5.
354
BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS’N, supra note 336, at 230.
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side (per song) amount.355 However, it should be noted that these payments
are capped at three times the minimum scale per side.356 With respect to
payment of artists at union scale as calculated by the hour, this method of
payment looks more akin to an hourly-wage arrangement for an
employee.357 Nonetheless, the fact that record companies pay this amount
at all has more to do with their agreement with the union rather than the
relationship to the artist, which undercuts the force of this argument.358 But
if payments are calculated by the per-side method, they appear to be
payments by the job and artists are likely to be deemed independent
contractors.359 In sum, the method of payment factor overwhelmingly
favors artists and producers being treated as independent contractors.
b. Group #2
Moving on to the second most important group of factors, the first
factor to consider is whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party. This factor probably favors artists
being treated as employees, but producers as independent contractors. Most
recording contracts are structured so the artist is required to create one
album, but the record company is also given a series of options to extend
the agreement for several more albums.360 The number of options the
record company has depends on the bargaining power of the artist, but five
or six options are common.361 Unlike artists, agreements between
producers and record companies do not give the record company options to
require the producer to produce another album.362
The second factor in this group is the skill required. This factor
likely weighs in favor of artists and producers being independent
contractors. As to artists, the record companies expend a tremendous
amount of energy trying to find which artists to sign and which to pass
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on.363 Not every artist can fill the void in the market the record company is
looking to capture and performing that sound can be quite a unique skill.364
The record companies seem to acknowledge this unique skill when they
include provisions in the recording contracts that the artists are of a special
and unique character that gives them peculiar value.365 Although drafted to
allow record companies to obtain injunctive relief if artists try to record for
other record companies during their contracts, these provisions may likely
be used to hoist the record companies by their own petards. For producers,
creating a sound recording is a highly-skilled job in that the producer not
only needs to have a grand vision for what the album or record will sound
like, but also frequently makes musical suggestions to achieve that sound.366
As with artists, the contracts between record companies and producers
contain clauses providing that the producers and their skills are special and
unique.367
The final factor in this group looks at the source of the
instrumentalities and tools. This factor likely favors artists and producers or
is neutral. Although record companies sometimes own their own recording
studios, it is rare that artists actually record there.368 If the recording is done
at an independent studio, this factor would be neutral. However, sometimes
the producer or even the artist owns the recording studio and equipment.369
In such a case, this factor could weigh in favor of the artists or producer
being an independent contractor. As far as providing the instruments used
during the recording sessions, these are normally owned by the artists and
are sometimes purchased or paid off using the advance received from the
record company.370
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c. Group #3
The third group of factors along the continuum of importance also
has three factors. The first factor in this group is the extent of the hired
party’s discretion over when and how long to work. Who this factor
benefits may very well depend on the stature of the artist or producer.
Brand new artists and producers are given little control over issues such as
the time for recording.371 But over time, artists and producers can secure
control over this aspect of their recordings.372
The second factor in this group is whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party. This factor certainly favors the record
companies.373 Record companies are, and always have been, in the business
of creating or acquiring rights to sound recordings and having those
recordings distributed.374 Recording the albums that will eventually be
distributed falls perfectly in line with these business practices.
The final factor in this group is the duration of the relationship
between the parties. Artists and producers will probably be treated
differently with respect to this factor. As mentioned earlier, recording
contracts with artists are typically for a certain number of albums and the
record company has several options to extend the relationship. 375 As a
result, the exact duration of the relationship can be difficult to determine,376
but typically lasts for a period of several years,377 although usually not more
than five to seven years.378 These long durations weigh in favor of artists
being deemed employees.
371
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Producers, on the other hand, are not typically signed to agreements
giving the record companies options to have producers work on subsequent
albums. Instead, a producer’s working relationship with the record
company is based upon the success of earlier recordings.379 Producers are
almost always hired on a project basis rather than a number of years. 380 In
fact, sometimes producers are hired to work on a single song rather than an
entire album.381 As a result, the duration factor weighs in favor of
producers being treated as independent contractors.
d. Group #4
Moving on to the less important end of the continuum, there are two
factors to consider. The first factor is the location of the work. This factor
likely weighs in favor of artists and producers as independent contractors.
Although record companies may have their own in-house studios382 and
prefer that they be used,383 it is rare for artists to record at those studios.384
Instead, the record companies try to include a provision in their contracts
giving the record company the right of final approval of the recording
studio.385 In practice, the record companies will approve any legitimate
studio.386 Given that very few recordings occur at the record companies’
studios, that the choice of the recording studio is made by artists and
producers,387 and that the record companies rarely exercise their ability to
veto a location, this factor probably favors artists and producers as
independent contractors.
The second factor in this group is the hired party’s role in hiring and
paying assistants. This factor probably weights in favor of artists and, to a
lesser extent, producers being independent contractors, but may depend on
California Labor Code, Section 2855.”); BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS’N, supra note 336, at
223 (describing that the AFM bylaws do not allow musicians to enter into personal service
contracts for more than five years without approval).
379
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380
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381
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383
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384
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385
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(“The masters recorded hereunder by Artist shall be recorded in a recording studio selected
or approved by Company at such times as Company may designate or approve.”).
386
MCPHERSON, supra note 341, at 83; BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS’N, supra note 336, at 332
(“Generally, the record company will approve any recording studio the artist or the artist’s
producer wishes to use, so long as it has satisfactory recording equipment and the studio’s
rates fit within the recording budget.”).
387
Menell & Nimmer, supra note 330, at 4.
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the use of a recording fund and recoupment. In terms of selecting those
who contribute to the recording, the artists and producers typically choose
which engineers, non-featured musicians, and non-featured vocalists to
hire.388 The selection of the producer is a bit more involved. To the record
company, selection of the producer is one of the more important provisions
of the recording contract.389 These provisions usually state that the
producer will be mutually selected by the artist and record company. 390 In
practice, however, the artist selects the producer, the record company
consults and generally defers to the artist unless the record company has
had a bad experience with the artist’s choice.391 Thus, it appears that artists
and producers play a large role in hiring assistants.
Paying for those assistants is a bit more complicated. Today, artists
pay for third parties out of a recording fund.392 Under this approach, the
recording costs and artist’s advance are combined into a single fund and the
artist is responsible for paying all recording costs out of this fund.393 Any
money leftover is the artist’s to keep as an advance.394 As a result of this
payment scheme, recording contracts include clauses specifying that the
artist is solely responsible for paying all third party charges incurred in the
production of the record.395 Because the artist advance and recording costs
are combined into one fund that is delivered to the artist to administer396 and
the contract provisions describe the artist as being responsible for payment,
it appears that this factor weighs in favor of the artist being an independent
contractor.
Although the recording fund is more common today, it was common
for the artist (especially a new artist) to be paid a separate advance and for
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the recording company to pay the recording costs.397 Although this
arrangement suggests that the record companies paid for assistants, it is
important to remember that all of the recording costs are treated as advances
to the artist.398 As a result, these costs are recoupable from the artist’s
royalties.399 Because of this, if the artist earns a sufficient amount of
royalties, it is the artist, not the record company, who pays for the recording
costs.400 Of course, if the artist is never successful, then the record
company will not recoup these costs and will end up paying for them. Who
ultimately pays for the assistants under the older method of payment
depends on whether the artist’s album is a commercial success.
In sum, this factor probably weighs in favor of artists and, to a lesser
extent, producers being independent contractors. Regardless of how these
assistants are paid, the artist and producer choose who works on the
recording. When a recording fund is used, the case for independent
contractor is strengthened. However, if the record company did not use a
recording fund and the costs are not recouped, then the record company will
have a stronger argument that this factor weighs in favor of the artist and
producer being employees.
e. Group #5
Concluding with the least important group of factors, the first factor
to consider is the right to control the manner and means by which the
product is accomplished. Whether this factor weighs in favor of artists and
producers being independent contractors or employees is difficult to
determine. Prior to the 1970s, record companies exercised a large amount
of creative control over the recording process, but since then, artists and
producers have moved away from an in-house creative process and are
exercising more creative control in recording.401 Today, for newer artists
and producers, the record companies may have language in the recording
contracts requiring the artist and producer to submit written recording
budgets specifying who the producer is and the financial agreement
397
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between the artist and producer, the songs to be recorded, the
accompaniment and arrangement of the recordings, any recording fees that
will exceed union scale, the dates and locations of the recordings and
mixing, and the estimated costs of these sessions.402 Despite this contract
language, in practice, written recording budgets are not always submitted or
followed.403 More experienced artists and producers may, however, secure
more control over the creative process, including the selection of music,
recording location and time, final sound mix, and recording budgets.404 As
a general matter, the record companies may have a better chance at artists
and producers being employees under the right to control factor when the
artists and producers are inexperienced. But the amount of control over the
creative process wanes as artists and producers get more experience.
Specific components of recording that are important in the creative
process are controlling music selection, monitoring what takes place during
recording sessions, and selecting where the recording occurs. For music
selection, the standard recording contract provides that the record company
will select the music to be recorded.405 But in practice, the record company
gives the artist a say in the decision.406 It is common today for the record
company to only reserve a right of approval of the music selection.407 This
is especially true for more seasoned artists.408 That said, there are actually
very few disputes about song choice.409
With respect to where the recording occurs, as discussed in
connection with the work location, record companies try to include clauses
giving the record company approval rights of the recording studio.410 In
practice, the producer will normally choose the studio to work in 411 and the
record companies will approve any legitimate studio.412 In addition to
where the recording occurs, recording contracts typically contain a
402
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provision that the record company has the right to have a representative
present to supervise the recording session.413 Nonetheless, it is very rare for
record companies to actually send a representative to the studio to
supervise.414
Although it appears that record companies actually exercise very
little control over the creative process, they do reserve the right to do so in
the recording contracts they enter into with artists and producers. As this
factor really focuses on the right to control instead of actual control, which
was rejected by the Supreme Court in Reid, it is likely that this factor will
weigh in favor of artists and producers being considered employees.
The second factor in this group is the label the hired and hiring party
use to describe the hired party. This factor certainly weighs in favor of
artists and producers being deemed employees. Nearly every recording
contract written since 1978 states that the works created by artists and
producers are works made for hire.415 Although many of the terms of a
recording contract are negotiable, this one is not.416
The final factor in the least important group of factors is whether the
hiring party is in business. Record companies are obviously in business.417
This factor clearly weighs in favor of the artists and producers being
employees.
f. Conclusions for the Music Industry
Table 6, below, summarizes the analysis of the Reid factors as
applied to sound recordings in the music industry. This table sorts the
factors by order of importance. A checkmark indicates this factor likely
weighs in favor of that party’s favored position (i.e. independent contractor
for artist and producers, employees for record companies). A question mark
indicates that it is unclear which way that factor applies.
Table 6
Summary of Sound Recording Analysis
Factor
Tax Treatment
Employee Benefits

Artists

?

413
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Record
Companies
? (artists)
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Payment Method
Additional Projects
Skill required
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Party
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As illustrated in Table 6, it is nearly certain that producers will be
treated as independent contractors. Five, and possibly six, of the most
important factors weigh in favor of producers as independent contractors.
In fact, the only factors suggesting producers would be employees are the
part of the regular business of the hiring party and the three least important
factors on the continuum.
The case for artists is more difficult. Nonetheless, it is more likely
that artists will be deemed independent contractors. Of the three most
important factors, two clearly weigh in favor of artists as independent
contractors. The other factor (employee benefits) is unclear. As described
earlier, when a party has two of these three factors in its favor, the courts
find in favor of that party 87% of the time.418 Expanding this to the next
group of factors, one favors the record companies, one favors the artists,
and the remaining factor either favors the artists or is neutral. If a court
were to rule that either the employee benefits or source of the
instrumentalities factor favored the artists, then a majority of the top six
factors would favor the artists. As described earlier, when a party has a
majority of these six factors in its favor, the courts find in favor of that party
418

See supra Figure 2.
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91% of the time.419 The next group of factors favors the record companies
when the artist is new and is split two to one when the artist is established.
This group is helpful to the record companies, but they face an uphill battle
given that the more important factors favor artists. The fourth group of
factors favors artists, which tips the scales slightly more towards artists
being considered independent contractors. However, the least important
factors all support the record companies. Of course, these are the least
important factors, so their utility to the record company is of little value.
Given the results of the most and second-most important groups of factors,
this will likely carry the day and artists will be deemed independent
contractors. That said, the record companies have a colorable argument that
artists should be treated as employees and this argument should not be
considered futile.420 Hopefully, the results of this study and the analysis
above provide a useful roadmap for litigants and judges navigating the
upcoming termination of transfer cases.
3. Business Planning
In addition to assisting litigators to evaluate and present their cases,
the results of this study will aid business planners in structuring
relationships between hiring and hired parties. For example, if a hiring
party seeks initial ownership of the copyright, it will be best advised to
withhold income taxes and issue a W2 rather than a 1099, provide employee
benefits such as life and health insurance, and pay the hired party at
regularly intervals. To further ensure a work made for hire result, the hiring
party could also include a provision in the agreement that reserves the right
for the hiring party to assign additional projects to the hired party. And
although difficult to control in some circumstances, the hiring party should
provide as many of the tools as possible. Structuring the relationship this
way forces the three most important factors and one or two of the factors in
the second group to weigh in favor of employee status. This should all but
assure a conclusion that the hired party will be an employee.
Likewise, for attorneys representing hired parties who would like to
retain initial ownership – to take advantage of the termination of transfer
provisions or to further exploit the copyright – they should insist on the
hiring party not withholding taxes and issuing a 1099, refuse insurance
coverage, and demand payment upon completion of projects or portions of
projects. Submitting invoices to the hiring party upon completion would be
a wise practice to adopt. Moreover, resisting a provision to accept
419
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additional projects and actually refusing additional projects until a new
agreement is established for a new project will place the hired party in a
strong position to argue that she is an independent contractor.
Of course, negotiating these terms may heavily depend on
bargaining power. A weak hired party may not be able to demand that no
additional projects be assigned. Likewise, a weak hiring party may not be
able to insist that the hired party work on the hiring party’s premises. But
knowing where the various factors lie on the continuum may help the
attorney for the weaker party focus on specific factors that the stronger
party may be willing to budge on. If choosing between asking the stronger
party to capitulate with respect to a provision about where the hired party
will physically work and a provision concerning the hours of the day the
hired party must work, the attorney for the weaker party should focus
negotiation efforts on the working hours provision because it is more
important than the work location factor.
V. CONCLUSION
Drawing a distinction between employees and independent
contractors in the work made for hire doctrine is a challenging endeavor,
but one that strikes at the heart of many copyright disputes. After a quarter
century of cases applying and interpreting the Supreme Court’s multifactor
test from CCNV v. Reid, this Article gives the first comprehensive study of
this multifactor test and answers the question of which factors are the most
and least important in these analyses. Some of the results are surprising
while other results are expected. But regardless of how these results
conform to our expectations, they will prove useful to the bench and bar
involved in copyright litigation and for business planning attorneys advising
their clients how to accomplish their copyright ownership goals.
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